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MARKET POWER IN POWER MARKETS: THE FILED-RATE
DOCTRINE AND COMPETITION IN ELECTRICITY
Sandeep Vaheesan*
State and federal initiatives have opened the American electric power industry to
competition over the past four decades. Although the process has not occurred uni-
formly across the country, wholesale electricity markets exist everywhere today.
Independent power producers can construct generation facilities and sell their out-
put to utilities and industrial customers through bilateral contracts. In many
regions, centralized power markets now facilitate the sale of billions of dollars in
electricity annually through auctions.
Although market forces have replaced direct price regulation in electricity, antitrust
enforcement has not expanded its role commensurately. A lack of competition has
been a serious problem in many power markets and led to billions of dollars in
wealth transfers from ratepayers to generators. The federal courts, however, have
invoked the filed-rate doctrine to prohibit private antitrust suits against generators
and other market participants accused of collusive behavior. They have held that
federal and state regulation is adequate to maintain competitive markets and ques-
tioned their own ability to deter anticompetitive behavior, effectively immunizing
power generators from antitrust damages liability. Congress or the Supreme Court
should limit the application of the filed-rate doctrine in electricity markets and al-
low for the antitrust laws to be enforced against collusive conduct.
Eliminating the filed-rate immunity, however, is not sufficient to create competitive
power markets. Private treble-damages suits could help deter express collusion be-
tween competing generators. Yet the antitrust laws are comparatively powerless to
remedy two important types of anticompetitive behavior seen in power markets. An-
titrust jurisprudence in the United States does not proscribe the exercise of
unilateral market power and creates high hurdles to finding liability for tacit collu-
sion. Given the limitations of traditional private antitrust remedies, federal and
state regulators must focus on creating competitive market structures. They can take
three concrete steps toward this end: police generator consolidation more carefully,
encourage expansion of the transmission grid, and expose more ratepayers to whole-
sale price signals. Applying these broader competition policy measures is necessary
to redeem a restructuring project that has resulted in several episodes of serious
market-power abuse and yielded uncertain benefits.
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The late Alfred Kahn helped deregulate the American airline in-
dustry as the head of the Civil Aeronautics Board in the Carter
Administration and advocated market pricing in other sectors of
the economy as a scholar.1 He, however, was no dogmatic propo-
nent of laissez-faire economics and recognized that government
regulation is necessary for well-functioning markets. Beyond the
state-enforced rules of contract, property, and tort required for a
market economy even to exist, Kahn argued that as direct price reg-
ulation retreats, antitrust enforcement must proportionately
1. Jonathan L. Rubin, The Premature Post-Chicagoan: Alfred E. Kahn, ANTITRUST, Summer
2011, at 75, 76.
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expand its role.2 Without antitrust enforcement or regulation, pro-
ducers can collude, merge to create monopolies, and exclude
aggressive rivals and new entrants, creating an environment of "rad-
ical deregulation."3 Anticompetitive conduct reduces economic
efficiency and transfers wealth from consumers to producers, de-
feating a principal rationale for deregulation. 4 Kahn thus viewed
antitrust enforcement and markets as complements, not
substitutes.
5
Although market forces have been introduced into the electric
power industry over the past four decades, the courts have declined
to follow Kahn's counsel and permit the full enforcement of the
antitrust laws in wholesale electricity markets. Several circuits have
invoked the filed-rate doctrine, which traditionally protected regu-
lated prices from antitrust challenges, to immunize power
generators from private suits under the Sherman Act. Since the
Sherman Act is primarily enforced through private actions for
treble damages,6 the courts have effectively eliminated the applica-
tion of one of the two major antitrust statutes in electricity
markets. 7 They have reasoned that regulatory oversight is sufficient
to create and preserve competitive power markets and that antitrust
litigation would only interfere with this objective. The sufficiency of
regulatory supervision is questionable, however, given that market-
power abuse in the California and Texas power markets transferred
billions of dollars from ratepayers to generators. The collusive be-
havior that occurred in the New York City market between 2006
and 2008 also illustrates how antitrust litigation could preserve com-
petitive markets. Regulators failed to prevent (or remedy) an
2. Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulatory Schizophrenia, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1059, 1059-60 (1987).
Kahn stressed the importance of antitrust enforcement in deregulated markets before and
after he served in the Carter Administration. See Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, Alfred E.
Kahn, 1917-2010, available at http://economics.mit.edu/files/8546.
3. Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield: Judicial Enforcement for a Deregulatory Era, 56
VAND. L. REv. 1591, 1596 (2003); see also Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement,
17J. EcoN. PERSP. 27, 27 (2003).
4. See Alfred E. Kahn, 1 Would Do It Again, REGULATION, Feb. 1988, at 22-23, 28 ("Noth-
ing is going to discredit deregulation more quickly and thoroughly than a failure of the
government to enforce the antitrust and consumer protection laws ... ").
5. See Rubin, supra note 1, at 80.
6. See Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement An
Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. REv. 879, 882, 888 (2008).
7. Both the government and private parties can still challenge mergers under Section 7
of the Clayton Act. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) can bring actions for equitable
relief under the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), see 15 U.S.C. § 57b (2006), which
has been interpreted, for the most part, to correspond closely to the Clayton and Sherman
Acts.
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extended episode of anticompetitive conduct, which could have
been deterred by a credible threat of treble damages liability.
Judicially or legislatively scaling back the filed-rate doctrine's ap-
plication in wholesale electricity markets would be good policy, but
the practical benefits of lifting this immunity may be small. Private
antitrust enforcement would help deter express collusion between
suppliers, a practice unquestionably harmful to consumers that oc-
curs on occasion in electricity markets. Yet two common forms of
anticompetitive conduct in electricity markets-exercise of unilat-
eral market power and tacit collusion-are either impossible or
difficult to remedy under current antitrust law. Well-established an-
titrust principles hold that a firm with market power is entitled to
maximize profits and that parallel conduct by firms without any ad-
ditional evidence of agreement is not illegal. Leaving aside an
improbable reinterpretation of the antitrust laws, a legislative orju-
dicial repeal of the filed-rate doctrine is likely to improve electricity
market outcomes only modestly.
The limits of antitrust underscore the central role of state and
federal regulators in creating competitive market structures. Regu-
lators should take three specific steps toward this goal. First, they
should apply stricter merger review standards to prevent generators
from increasing their market power through consolidation and, if
necessary, order large generators to sell capacity to remedy chroni-
cally noncompetitive markets. Second, given how transmission-grid
constraints create small geographic markets that are vulnerable to
anticompetitive behavior, the federal government and the states
should promote investment in transmission to widen the geo-
graphic scope of power markets. Third, on the demand side,
federal and state regulators should encourage customers to switch
to pricing schemes that reflect wholesale prices. Introducing price
signals to ratepayers can create elasticity on the demand side and
reduce the incentive of generators to exercise market power gener-
ally. If industry restructuring is to yield its long-awaited benefits,
regulators must play the lead role in creating and preserving com-
petitive market conditions.
Part I of this Article discusses the history of the electric power
industry and focuses on the restructuring efforts in recent decades.
Part II examines why wholesale electricity markets have been vul-
nerable to anticompetitive behavior and describes three notable
episodes of market misconduct that led to large wealth transfers
from consumers to generators. Part III addresses the filed-rate doc-
trine and its application to electricity markets. It contends that the
theoretical bases for applying the doctrine in electricity markets are
924 [VOL. 46:3
Market Power in Power Markets
unsound. Part IV calls for eliminating this immunity, but explains
why lifting the limits on private antitrust enforcement is not suffi-
cient to create and preserve competitive markets. Given the
limitations of private antitrust enforcement, Part V addresses what
state and federal regulators can do to create competitive electricity
markets and recommends a strengthened merger policy, encour-
agement of investment in the transmission grid, and introduction
of retail prices that track wholesale fluctuations.
I. RESTRUCTURING THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY
Historically, the electric power industry was regulated as a natu-
ral monopoly from generation to consumption. Most often, a single
firm would be vertically integrated, owning the generation, trans-
mission, and distribution facilities needed to produce and retail
electricity.a Due to the supposedly substantial economies of scale at
all three levels of production and economies of scope between
them, utilities were given exclusive franchises and insulated against
new entrants. 9 To protect customers from this monopoly power,
states imposed cost-of-service regulation on franchised utilities.10
Under this regime, state public utility commissions set rates that
allowed utilities to recover their costs and earn a "reasonable" rate
of return on their capital investments." These rates were adjusted
periodically to reflect changes in costs. In states that have not re-
structured their electric power industries, utilities are still vertically
integrated and subject to cost-of-service regulation.
1 2
In the 1970s, the natural-monopoly model in electricity markets
faced growing public disenchantment. Economic theory and anec-
dotal evidence suggested that the natural-monopoly model was
flawed and contributed to higher electricity rates) 3 Since power
generation has only modest economies of scale and the transmis-
sion grid can support wholesale commerce, many commentators
argued that the wholesale generation sector could be opened to
8. Paul L. Joskow, Restructuring Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electricity
Sector, 11J. EcON. PERSP. 119, 121 (1997)
9. Id. at 121-22.
10. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Joseph P. Tomain, Rethinking Reform of Electriciy Markets, 40
WAKE FoREsr L. REv. 497, 507-08 (2005).
11. See id. at 508.
12. Energy Info. Admin., Electricity Restructuring by State, available at http://
www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/restructure-elect.html.
13. See generally STEPHEN G. BREYER & PAUL W. MAcAvoY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION (1974).
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market competition.14 Although transmission and distribution were
recognized as natural monopolies, "open access" to the grid would
allow for competition between multiple generation companies. 15
Over the past four decades, Congress and the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) have taken several steps to lower
barriers to entry in electricity generation. The Public Utility Regula-
tory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA) required utilities to purchase
power from designated nonutility generators. 16 Although it did not
create competitive wholesale power markets, PURPA encouraged
new entry into power generation. 7 In 1992, Congress passed the
Energy Policy Act, which lifted regulatory barriers to entry in gener-
ation and directed transmission owners to provide grid access to
nonaffiliated generators. "' Beginning in 1991, FERC permitted gen-
erators on a case-by-case basis to sell at "market-based rates." 19 FERC
issued Orders 888 and 889 in 1996, which mandated open access
and transparent pricing of transmission facilities. 20 Transmission
owners cannot deny grid access or offer discriminatory rates to in-
dependent generators. 21 Accordingly, competitive wholesale power
markets, in which power can be sold through short- and long-term
contracts, exist throughout the country, even in states that have not
otherwise restructured their utilities.22
To eliminate the threat of discrimination in transmission access,
some states have gone beyond Orders 888 and 889. California,
14. See, e.g., Joskow, supra note 8, at 122-23.
15. Id. at 120, 133.
16. Id. at 124.
17. David B. Spence, The Politics of Electricity Restructuring: Theory vs. Practice, 40 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 417, 424 (2005).
18. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) to (d) (1994).
19. See Udi Helman, Market Power Monitoring and Mitigation in the U.S. Wholesale Power
Markets, 31 ENERGY 877, 884 (2006).
20. 18 C.F.R. § 35.28 (2011); id. § 37.6.
21. Paul L. Joskow, Transmission Policy in the United States, 13 UrIL. POL'Y 95, 104 (2005).
22, See Paul L.Joskow, Markets for Power in the United States: An Interim Assessment 6
(AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 05-20, 2005), availa-
ble at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=845785 ("As a direct result of
FERC's 'open access' Orders 888 and 889, all transmission-owning utilities in the U.S. (either
directly or through an independent system operator or ISO) now have made available rea-
sonably standardized cost-based transmission service tariffs to support the provision of
transmission service on their networks to third parties; provide easily available real time infor-
mation to third parties about the availability and prices of transmission service on their
networks; are required to interconnect independent power producers to their networks,
must make their best efforts to expand their transmission networks to meet transmission
service requests when adequate capacity is not available to accommodate these requests, must
provide certain network support services, including balancing services, to third parties using
their networks; and are required to adhere to functional separation rules between the opera-
tors of their transmission networks and those who generate and market electricity using that
network to mitigate abusive self-dealing behavior.").
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Texas, and many Northeastern states have required transmission
owners to sell most or all of their generation facilities.23 This struc-
tural separation of generation and transmission eliminates the
incentive of transmission owners to discriminate against nonaf-
filiated generators.2 4 In addition, many of the same states have
directed transmission owners to join a regional transmission organi-
zation or independent system operator (collectively, RTOs) .25 RTOs
are nonprofit entities that operate state or regional transmission
grids and centralized wholesale power markets.
26
In regions with RTOs, generators may sell power through bilat-
eral contracts or through centralized spot markets. In a spot
market, generators submit supply bids and load-serving entities
27
and large industrial customers file demand schedules to the RTO
for every hour (or smaller time increment) of the following day.
28
In a well-functioning market, the bids of generators should equal
their marginal cost of production.2 9 The market operator orders
the supply bids from lowest to highest cost and sets the price for the
entire market equal to the bid of the most expensive unit necessary
to meet demand in each hour.30 Every generator with a bid equal to
or below the market price produces power and is paid the market
price.3
1
23. Id. at 104-05.
24. SeeJoskow, supra note 8, at 132-33.
25. See FERC, Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent System Operators
(ISO), FERC, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp (last visited Nov. 2,
2011).
26. Joskow, supra note 21, at 105-06.
27. A utility that "[slecures energy and transmission service ... to serve the electrical
demand and energy requirements of its end-use customers." See Energy Info. Admin, Glos-
sary, available at http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm?id=L.
28. See Richard Green, Reshaping the CEGB: Electricity Privatization in the UK 1 UTIL. PoL'Y
245, 246 (1991) (describing the operation of a single-price power "pool").
29. See id. at 248.
30. Id. Most markets also operate similar auctions for generators to remain on standby
in the event of discrepancies between actual supply and demand and forecasted supply and
demand ("ancillary services") and to construct adequate generation over the long run ("ca-
pacity markets"). See PJM, Ancillary Services, PJM, http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-
operations/ancillary-services.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2012); PJM, Reliability Pricing Model,
PJM, http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/rpm.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
31. See Green, supra note 28, at 248.
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1I. MARKET POWER IN POWER MARKETS
Despite its great promise, electricity restructuring has arguably
failed to deliver significant benefits. 32 The properties of electricity
markets make them vulnerable to the exercise of market power
("exercise of market power" and "market-power abuse" will be used
interchangeably), which has brought the value of the entire restruc-
turing project into doubt. In fact, during the height of the
California electricity crisis in 2000 and 2001, the wholesale markets
almost certainly produced higher rates for consumers than the
traditional cost-of-service regime would have. 33
A. Electricity Markets Are Vulnerable to Market Power Abuse
Supply-and-demand characteristics make electricity markets vul-
nerable to market-power abuse. Due to the current infeasibility of
large-scale electricity storage, supply and demand must be in bal-
ance at all times.3 4 Generation capacity faces a hard upper limit in
the short and medium term. If demand exceeds a system's collec-
tive capacity, blackouts or brownouts will occur. 35 Moreover, new
capacity can only be constructed over the long-term. A gas-fired
combustion turbine plant takes two to three years to license and
construct.36 A coal-fired power plant typically requires four years to
bring online.3 7 A nuclear power plant may take even longer 38 -cost
overruns and delays are major obstacles to any new nuclear-power
development in the United States.39 As a result of these constraints
32. John Kwoka, Restructuring the U.S. Electric Power Sector: A Review of Recent Studies, 32
REv. INnus. ORG. 165, 194 (2008) ("[Tlhe ten studies reviewed consist of six consulting re-
ports plus four studies authored by academics. It is interesting to note that all six consulting
reports report favorable results [from electricity restructuring]. Two of the four academic
studies, by contrast, offer negative overall assessments. If the latter unsponsored studies can
be viewed as more independent of interested parties, then one might conclude that indepen-
dent views of restructuring are considerably more evenly split than the overall number of
studies might suggest.").
33. See, e.g., Severin Borenstein et al., Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California's Restruc-
tured Wholesale Electricity Market, 92 AM. ECON. Rav. 1376, 1395-98 (2002).
34. John Kwoka & Kamen Madjarov, Making Markets Work: The Special Case of Electricity,
ELEcrRicrrvJ., Nov. 2007, at 24, 27.
35. Id. at 28.
36. Id. at 29.
37. Id.
38. Id. (noting a lead time of six years for an "advanced" nuclear plant of minimum
efficient scale).
39. See Daniel Weisser et a., Nuclear Power and Post-2012 Energy and Climate Change Poli-
cies, 11 ENvrL. Sci. & POL'v 467, 468 (2008).
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on output, the supply of electricity becomes highly inelastic as de-
mand approaches total installed capacity.
On the demand side, consumers pay a uniform rate throughout
the day even though the cost of producing power varies from hour
to hour.4 At off-peak, low-demand hours, coal-fired, hydroelectric,
and nuclear baseload power plants with low marginal but high fixed
costs set the wholesale price. 41 At peak, high-demand hours, natu-
ral-gas or oil-combustion turbines with high marginal but low fixed
costs set the wholesale price. 42 These units can ramp their output
up and down quickly and can thus respond to intra-day changes in
demand.43 Because most users are insulated from wholesale prices
on an intra-day basis, the elasticity of demand for electricity is very
low." Prices cannot play the rationing function that they do in most
markets.
A simple hypothetical illustrates the disconnect between retail
and hourly wholesale electricity prices. Imagine a gasoline market
in which retail prices are fixed at $3.00 per gallon, but the underly-
ing wholesale price of gasoline fluctuates between $1 and $5 per
gallon. Even as wholesale prices move in response to changing sup-
ply and demand conditions, drivers would not alter their driving
habits. The fixed retail price would insulate them from underlying
market forces. In effect, the public would drive "too much" at times
when wholesale prices are high and drive "too little" when whole-
sale prices are low, due to the fixed wholesale price.
Due to the institutional and engineering characteristics of elec-
tricity markets, "pivotal" generators-those that are critical to meet
load-can profitably raise market prices. 45 These generators can ei-
ther withhold some of their capacity from the market ("physical
withholding") or submit bids above their marginal cost ("economic
withholding") to raise market prices above competitive levels. 46 This
strategy may be especially profitable for a generator owner with
both peaking and baseload capacity in its portfolio.4' The peaking
40. Severin Borenstein, The Trouble. with Electricity Markets: Understanding Calfornia's Re-
structuring Disaster, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 196 (2002).
41. Darren Bush & Carrie Mayne, In (Reluctant) Defense of Enron: Why Bad Regulation Is to
Blame for California's Power Woes (or Why Antitrust Law Fails to Protect Us Against Market Power
When the Market Rules Encourage Its Use), 83 OR. L. Ruv. 207, 236 (2004).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Harnish Fraser, The Importance of an Active Demand Side in the Electricity Industry,
EucmcrrvJ., Nov. 2001, at 52, 70-71.
45. See Seth Blumsack et al., Market Power in Deregulated Wholesale Electricity Markets: Issues
in Measurement and the Cost of Mitigation, ELucTvacrrvJ., Nov. 2002, at 11, 13, 16.
46. C.K. Woo et al., Costs of Electricity Deregulation, 31 ENERY 747, 754 (2006).
47. See Darren Bush, Electricity Merger Analysis: Market Screens, Market Definition, and Other
Lemmings, 32 REv. Iun. ORG, 263, 272 (2008).
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unit can be used to elevate the market-wide price4 and increase the
profits on baseload generation, which has a much lower marginal
cost.49 In other words, this owner has both the ability and the incen-
tive to raise market prices.
Centralized wholesale markets are also vulnerable to collusion.
Generators recognize that bidding at marginal cost will reduce col-
lective profits and that it is in their mutual interest to withhold
economic or physical capacity.50 The properties of centralized elec-
tricity markets may permit firms to collude tacitly-that is, raise
prices jointly without any direct communication. 5' Generators sub-
mit hourly bids to sell a homogeneous product on a daily basis, and
generally all receive the same market price in a given hour.5 2 Regu-
lar and frequent bidding into a single-price spot market ensures
that detection and punishment of "cheating" on the collusive ar-




50. See Friedel Bolle, Supply Function Equilibria and the Danger of Tacit Collusion: The Case of
Spot Markets for Electricity, 14 ENERGY ECON. 94, 102 (1992).
51. Ray Rees, Tacit Collusion, 9 OxroRD Rev. EcoN. POL'y 27, 27-28 (1993).
52. See Bolle, supra note 50; Rafael Emmanuel A. Macatangay, Tacit Collusion in the Fre-
quently Repeated Multi-Unit Uniform Price Auction for Wholesale Electricity in England and Wales, 13
EuRo. J L. & EcoN. 257, 258 (2002).
53. Natalia Fabra, Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions: Uniform versus Discriminator, 51 J.
INDus. EcoN. 271, 271-73 (2003).
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Consider four gas-fired generators with similar marginal costs that
are required to meet load in a market during the high demand 4-5
PM hour on weekdays. One of these four generators, and not neces-
sarily the same one on each day, also sets the price for the entire
market in this hour. The generators participate in the same market
on a daily basis and recognize that that one of them sets the price in
this late afternoon hour. They may realize that it is in their collec-
tive interest to submit individual bids above their marginal cost and
raise the market price in that hour. With nothing more than the
indirect "communication" in the spot market, the generators may
be able to raise the market price in the 4-5 PM hour through eco-
nomic withholding. A generator that cheats and submits a bid
below the collusive level would lower the spot price for the entire
market. As a result, this deviation from the collusive bidding pat-
tern would likely be detected and punished in short order. The
other generators would respond with marginal-cost bidding and dis-
sipate the profits arising from collusion.5 4 Like the described
hypothetical, many electricity markets have comparatively few inde-
pendent generators, making it easier to monitor and enforce
collusive arrangements. 55 Some critics have cited the relative ease of
collusion in centralized markets as a reason to rely on purely bilat-
eral contract markets instead.56
The inadequacy of the existing transmission grid has also con-
tributed to market power. Transmission congestion effectively splits
a large regional power market into smaller markets. 57 Isolated mar-
kets cannot meet demand from lower-cost generators located
farther away and become reliant on local generators that often both
have higher production costs and face only limited competition.58
When only a few companies own all the generation capacity in a
market, they may have the ability and incentive to raise prices uni-
laterally or jointly above competitive levels. Congestion on the grid
can be analogized to road congestion and its effect on trade, even
though the physics of transmitting electricity are different. If, for
example, New Yorkers could not purchase milk from dairies in Ver-
mont and other neighboring states due to congested highways, they
54. Id. at 283.
55. MARK IVALDI ET AL., The Economics of Tacit Collusion: Implications for Merger Control in
THE PoLmcAL ECONOMY OF ANTITRUST 217, 220 (Vivek Ghosal &Johan Stennek eds., 2007).
56. John Bower & Derek W. Bunn, Model-Based Comparisons of Pool and Bilateral Mar-
kets for Electricity, 21 ENERGYJ. 1, 12-14 (2000).
57. See Brendan Kirby & Eric Hirst, Maintaining Transmission Adequacy in the Future, ELEc.
TmcrrvJ., Nov. 1999, at 62, 65-66.
58. See Paul L. Joskow & Jean Tirole, Transmission Rights and Market Power on Electric Power
Networks, 31 RANDJ. EcON. 450, 451 (2000).
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would have to buy milk at higher prices from in-state dairies that
did not have to compete against out-of-state suppliers.
The following diagram illustrates how generators can exploit
their market power, unilaterally or collectively, through the eco-
nomic or physical withholding of output. The exercise of market
power can reduce economic efficiency (i.e., create "deadweight
loss") and lead to large wealth transfers from consumers to
generators.
FIGuRE 2
Price (Withholdi Wthholding) Supply (No
Withholding)




B. Regulatory Oversight of Power Markets
FERC has established rules to prevent generators from exercising
market power. The Federal Power Act (FPA) charges FERC with
maintaining electricity rates that are "just and reasonable."59 Under
its restructuring initiatives, FERC has interpreted this provision to
require generators that want to sell at "market-based rates" to
demonstrate every three years that they either lack or have miti-
gated market power.60 A generator that has market power must sell
59. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2006).
60. Some commentators have questioned whether the FPA authorizes FERC to rely on
market forces to set wholesale electricity prices. See Gerald Norlander, May the ftERC Rely on
Markets to Set Electric Ratest, 24 ENERGY Lj. 65, 73-74 (2003) ("[T~he essence of these market-
based rates is that no definite rates or rate changes are actually filed by the utility.... This, of
course, is fundamentally inconsistent with the plain language of the FPA, which requires
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its power at cost-based rates, which cover the generator's costs and
provide a reasonable return on its capital investment. FERC also
has authority under the FPA to review electric-utility mergers pro-
spectively6 1-a responsibility it shares with the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which re-
view mergers under the Clayton Act,62 and with state public utility
commissions. If prices consistently remain above competitive levels
or structural conditions are noncompetitive, FERC can also impose
market-wide price caps to prevent prices from rising to monopoly
levels. 63 FERC has imposed bid caps on generators that can influ-
ence market prices.64 Markets in the eastern United States have bid
caps of $1,000/MWh, while the California market has a lower cap,
due to less competitive structural conditions.6 5 In smaller markets
with congested transmission lines, even more stringent rules apply
due to the greater potential for market-power abuse.66
FERC also has retrospective, remedial powers at its disposal. It
requires all market participants to file quarterly reports docu-
menting their wholesale activities. 67 If it finds that a generator has
violated market rules through, for example, the exercise of market
power, FERC can suspend a generator's authority to sell at market
rates68-a costly penalty when market prices are high. FERC can
also order generators to disgorge profits attributed to market ma-
nipulation.69 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) granted FERC
the authority to impose civil fines of up to $1 million per day for
each violation of market rules, a substantial increase over the previ-
ous maximum of $10,000 per day per violation. 70
filing of 'schedules showing all rates and chargers' before they are effective. A market-based
rate, which continually fluctuates with market prices, simply cannot be reconciled with the
statutory requirement of schedules 'showing' the rates demanded or charged."). The courts,
however, have upheld FERC's use of market-based rates to fulfill its statutory obligation, pro-
vided that the market is competitive. See California v. FERC, 383 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir.
2004); La. Energy & Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
61. Inquiry Concerning the Commission's Merger Policy Under the Federal Power Act:
Policy Statement, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,595, 68,596 (1996), recons. denied, 62 Fed. Reg. 33,341
(1997).
62. See 15 U.SC. § 18a (2006).
63. Joseph T. Kelliher, Market Manipulation, Market Power, and the Authority of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 26 ENERGY L.J. 1, 11 (2005).
64. See Helman, supra note 19, at 889.
65. Id. at 890.
66. See id.
67. Revised Public Utility Filing Requirements, 67 Fed. Reg. 31,044, 31,069 (2002).
6W Investigation of Terms and Conditions of Public Utility Market-Based Rate Authori-
zation, 105 F.E.R.C. 1 61,218, 62,171 (2003).
69. Id. at 62,148.
70. Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1284, 119 Stat. 594, 980 (2005) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 825o-
1(b)).
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In Order 2000, FERC required that RTOs establish market-moni-
toring units (MMUs) to oversee daily market conduct and
outcomes. 71 MMUs collect extensive data on generator behavior
and market performance and submit annual public reports to
FERC.72 As a means of preventing tacit collusion, several markets
permit the release of generator bid data only on a six-month lag
and without identifying individual generators by name.73 MMUs
have only modest remedial powers like recommending revisions to
market rules and issuing warnings to market participants found to
have engaged in anticompetitive behavior.74 They are, however, ob-
ligated to report evidence of misconduct to FERC, which can
further investigate and bring enforcement actions.
7 5
C. Notable Episodes of Anticompetitive Behavior
Despite regulatory oversight, market power abuse has been a de-
fining feature of electricity markets. On several occasions,
generators have raised market prices far above competitive levels
and transferred millions or even billions of dollars from consumers
to themselves. The most serious and publicized episode of such
abuse occurred in California in 2000 and 2001. Other notable epi-
sodes of anticompetitive behavior occurred in Texas in 2005 and
New York City between 2006 and 2008.
In designing the state's wholesale power markets in the late
1990s, California regulators made several mistakes. They fixed retail
rates for a four-year period, under the assumption that wholesale
prices would be below retail rates during this time, and allow in-
cumbent utilities to recover the "stranded costs" in their old
71. See Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 898-99 (Jan. 6, 2000)
(codified in 18 C.F.R. pt. 35); see also Fereidoon P. Sioshansi, Competitive Electricity Markets:
Questions Remain about Design, Implementation, Performance, 21 EI.EcrnucrrJ., Mar. 2008, at 74,
81.
72. Charles Goldman et al., A Review of Market Monitoring Activities at U.S. Independent
System Operators 17-19 (Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Working Paper No. 53975,
2004).
73. See Josd A. Garcia & James D. Reitzes, International Perspectives on Electricity Market
Monitoring and Market Power Mitigation, 6 REv NETWoRm ECON. 372, 392-93 (2007). This re-
striction on data dissemination has been criticized because it prevents third parties from
studying market performance and allows generators manipulating the market to remain
anonymous. See Frank A. Wolak, Managing Unilateral Market Power in Electricity 10-12 (World
Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3691, 2005).
74. See Goldman, supra note 72, at 21.
75. Parviz Adib & David Hurlbut, Market Power and Market Monitoring in CompETITIV
ELEcucrrv MAmtErs: DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, PERFoRMANCE 267, 285 (Fereidoon P. Si-
oshansi ed., 2008).
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investments.7 6 In other words, utilities were permitted to recover a
reasonable return on capital investments made under cost-of-ser-
vice regulation, which were expected to have less value in a market
environment. Policymakers also required incumbents to sell all
their nonnuclear generation capacity. 77 Five companies purchased
this capacity.7 This proved to be another critical mistake as experi-
ence showed that five independent generators were not enough to
create competitive market conditions. 79 On top of ordering divesti-
tures, regulators prohibited long-term contracting, which effectively
required purchasers to obtain all their power through the spot mar-
ket. 0 This restriction on long-term contracting was intended to
create a liquid spot market,1t but it removed an incentive for gener-
ators to bid competitively in that market.8
2
Although the California market performed comparatively well in
1998 and 1999,83 tight supply-demand conditions set the stage for
rampant market-power abuse in 2000 and the first six months of
2001. In the summer of 2000, diminished snow pack in the hydroe-
lectric-rich Pacific Northwest and increased demand in the Desert
Southwest reduced the availability of imported power for Califor-
nia, which has historically been very dependent on out-of-state
generation. 4 The reduction in exports from these states eliminated
an important competitive constraint on the five major owners of
in-state generation.8 5 With the diminished out-of-state competition,
in-state generators raised prices through physical withholding (stra-
tegic plant outages) and economic withholding (bids in excess of
76. Paul L. Joskow, California's Electricity Crisis, 17 OxFoan REv. ECON. POL'Y 365, 368
(2001).
77. See id. at 369.
78. Id. at 371.
79. James Bushnell, Looking for Trouble: Competition Policy in the U.S. Electricity Industy, in
ELEccrICy DEREGULATION: CHOICES AND CHALLENGES 256, 289 (James M, Griffin & Steven L.
Puller eds. 2005).
80. See id. at 369.
81. Frank A. Wolak, Diagnosing the California Electricity Crisis, 20 ELEcnucrrvJ., Aug.-Sept.
2003, at 11, 17.
82. Under forward contracting, generators often agree to sell power at a fixed price. If
their capacity is not sufficient to meet their contractual obligations (i.e., they are "short" on
power), they will have to purchase power on the spot market to cover the difference. They
thus have an incentive to maintain spot prices at competitive levels. SeeJames B. Bushnell et
al., Vertical Arrangements, Market Structure, and Competition: An Analysis of Restructured U.S. Elec-
tricity Markets 1, 38-39 (NBER, Working Paper No. 13507, 2007) ("The horizontal structure
of the markets is important, but similar horizontal structures can produce dramatically differ-
ent outcomes under different vertical arrangements. The extent to which these
arrangements constitute firm price commitments also plays a strong role in the impact of
vertical structure on the market outcomes.").
83. See Wolak, supra note 81, at 20.
84. Id. at 21.
85. Id.
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marginal cost).86 Empirical evidence suggests that unilateral with-
holding was the main cause of increased wholesale prices and that
tacit collusion was not necessary to bring about these noncompeti-
tive outcomes. 87 Other market strategies compounded the
withholding of generation and frustrated regulatory solutions. For
instance, Enron, which did not own generation but was an active
marketer of electricity, overscheduled transmission capacity to cre-
ate an illusion of scarcity and exported and reimported power as a
means of evading in-state price caps.88
The crisis culminated in rolling blackouts throughout the state
when demand exceeded supply in January 2001.89 The fact that the
blackouts occurred in winter starkly underscored the artificial
shortage arising from the generators' withholding. Demand could
not be satisfied even though in-state installed capacity exceeded
peak load by nearly 50 percent.9 The retail price freeze, moreover,
wrought havoc on the state's two largest utilities. Retail prices re-
mained fixed during the period, and so demand did not decline in
response to higher wholesale prices. Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E)
and Southern California Edison (SCE) had to continue to meet
load, buying high-priced wholesale power and reselling it at lower
retail rates. 91 The situation became so dire that PG&E filed for
bankruptcy and the California wholesale market operator im-
ploded.92 In the spring and summer of 2001, decisive state action
finally ended the crisis. The state entered into long-term power
purchase contracts with generators on behalf of PG&E and SCE;
this intervention brought the situation under control as power no
longer had to be purchased on the dysfunctional spot market.93
86. Paul L. Joskow & Edward Kahn, A Quantitative Analysis of Pricing Behavior in Califor-
nia's Wholesale Electricity Market During Summer 2000, 23 ENERGYJ., no. 4, 2002, at 1, 3-4, 9; see
Joskow, supra note 76, at 382 fig. 4 (depicting the dramatic spike in plant outages in the fall
of 2000 vis-A-vis the fall of 1999).
87. Steven L. Puller, Pricing and Firm Conduct in California's Deregulated Electricity Market,
89 REv. EcON. & STATS. 75, 85 (2007); Frank A. Wolak, Measuring Unilateral Market Power in
Wholesale Electricity Markets: The California Market, 1998-2000 93 AM. ECON. REv. 425, 430
(2003).
88. See Garcia & Reitzes, supra note 76, at 381-82 (noting that FERC concluded that
Enron, among other firms, engaged in "economic withholding, inflated bidding, and ...
'megawatt laundering'"); CAISO, ANALVsis or TRADING AND SCHEDULING STRATEGIES
DESCRIBED IN ENRON MEMOS (2002), available at http://www.caiso.com/Documents/
Analysis-TradingandSchedulingStrategiesDescribedinEnronMemosDMA1O_402_.pdf.
89. Wolak, supra note 81, at 24.
90. California recorded peak demand of 30,000 MW and had 44,000 MW in installed
generation capacity. Id. at 25
91. Id. at 29-30.
92. Id. at 29.
93. See id. at 30-31.
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The costs of the crisis in California were staggering. Empirical
analysis reveals that the market manipulation in 2000 alone re-
sulted in hundreds of millions of dollars in deadweight losses and
transferred approximately $4 billion from consumers to genera-
tors.94 Market inefficiencies and wealth transfers are estimated to
have been nearly $20 billion over the entire period of the crisis,
from June 2000 to June 2001.95 FERC has spent much of the past
decade seeking to disgorge the profits that generators and power
marketers earned from market-power abuse and other
misconduct.96
The Texas wholesale power market experienced less acute but
still significant market-power abuse in the summer of 2005. The ca-
pacity of each of the two largest generator owners was critical for
meeting demand during a significant fraction of hours in that pe-
riod.97 If either entity withdrew its entire capacity from the market,
demand would exceed supply, resulting in blackouts. The Texas
market had also exhibited more price spikes in 2005 than it had in
previous years.98 An investigation by the market monitor found that
TXU, the largest generator in the state, submitted bids above mar-
ginal cost during peak hours from June to September 2005 to raise
market prices in the spot market.99 TXU's bidding behavior was es-
timated to have raised the average spot price of power by 15.5
percent and elevated the total costs of power purchased on the spot
market by $70 million)00 TXU increased its own profits in the spot
market by approximately $18.8 million. 10 Although only a small
fraction of power was purchased on the spot market, higher prices
on this market likely affected expectations about future prices and
resulted in higher prices on bilateral contracts, too.i02 The total cost
to the public of TXU's bidding strategy thus may have significantly
exceeded $70 million.10 3 The Public Utility Commission of Texas
(PUCT) initially sought $210 million in fines and refunds from
94. Borenstein et al., supra note 33, at 1396, 1398.
95. Wolak, supra note 73, at 7.
96. James L. Sweeney, California Electricity Restructuring, The Crisis, and Its Aftermath, in
ELECTPCury MARKET REFORM: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 319, 371 (Fereidoon P. Si-
oshansi & Wolfgang Pfaffenberger eds., 2006).
97. POTOMAc ECONOMICS, 2005 STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT FOR THE ERCOT WHOLE-
SALE ELECTRICIT MARKETS 140 (2006), available at http://www.potomaceconomics.com/
uploads/ercot_reports/2005%20ERCOT%20SOM%20REPORTFinal.pdf
98. Id. at 7.
99. POTOMAc ECONOMICs, INVESTIGATION OF THE WHOLESALE MARKET ACTIVITIES OF TXU
FROM JUNE 1 TO SEPTEMBER 30, 2005, at 27 (2007).
100. Id. at 30.
101. Id. at 33.
102. Id. at 31.
103. Id.
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TXU.10 4 Ultimately, however, the PUCT and TXU settled for only
$15 million. 10
Between January 2006 and March 2008, KeySpan manipulated
prices in the New York City capacity market.1 0 6 At that time, Key
Span was one of three major owners of generation in New York
City.10 7 Because the New York City market is often separated from
the Upstate New York market due to transmission constraints, Key
Span had the ability to raise market prices.108 The market monitor
had imposed a price cap to protect consumers in New York City
from the effects of this concentrated market. 109 In response to new
entry in generation and anticipated lower prices in the New York
City area, KeySpan wanted to acquire the assets of the Astoria Gen-
erating Company (Astoria), one of its major rivals in the New York
City market, but did not pursue this option on account of the anti-
trust concerns." 0 KeySpan instead entered in 2006 into a swap
contract with a financial services company."' That company, later
revealed to be Morgan Stanley, entered into an offsetting swap with
Astoria."2 From this arrangement, KeySpan obtained the right to a
share of its rival's profits when capacity prices exceeded competitive
levels. 13 The swap amounted to KeySpan virtually acquiring its ri-
val. As a result, KeySpan had an incentive to bid its capacity at the
level of the market cap. Although it lost some sales on account of its
104. Tom Fowler, TXU Faces Record Penalty, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 29, 2007, at Al.
105. Tom Fowler, TXU Sibling Settles on Fine, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 27, 2008, at Bi.
106. See Paul L.Joskow, Capacity Payments in Imperfect Electricity Markets: Need and Design, 16
UTL. POL'v 159, 170 (2008) (explaining why capacity markets are needed to ensure that
generators earn adequate revenues to cover their fixed costs and offer an adequate rate of
return); NYISO, About NYISO-Understanding the Markets-The Capacity Market http://
www.nyiso.com/public/about-nyiso/understandingthe_markets/capacity market/index
.jsp (describing how the market matches buyers and sellers of generation capacity on a
forward-looking basis) (last visited Sept. 17, 2012).
107. See United States v. KeySpan Corp., 763 F. Supp. 2d 633, 635-36 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(citations omitted) ("[Flrom 2003 to 2008, Key[S]pan possessed market power in the New
York City capacity market. As major electricity generators... [KeySpan and other] firms were
designated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission as 'pivotal suppliers,' meaning a
portion of each firm's output was vital to satisfy capacity demand.").
108. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL ELmcrruc TRANSMISSION CONGESTION SrUDY 45
(2009).
109. See KeySpan Corp., 763 F. Supp. 2d at 636.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Complaint at 3, United States v. Morgan Stanley, No. 11 Civ. 6875 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,
2011).
113. See KeySpan, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 636 (citations omitted) ("If the Clearing Price was
above $7.57 per kW-month, the Bank was required to pay Key[S]pan a multiple of the differ-
ence between those two prices. In contrast, if the Clearing Price was below $7.57, Key[S] pan
was required to pay the Bank a multiple of the difference.").
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higher bids, it more than recouped this loss through higher mar-
gins on its remaining capacity sales and proceeds from Astoria's
inflated profits.
1 4
During the twenty-six month period in which this arrangement
remained in effect, it resulted in significant wealth transfers from
ratepayers in New York City to KeySpan and other generators situ-
ated within the metropolitan area. KeySpan increased its own
profits by $49 million, 1 5 and some estimates suggest that New York
City consumers may have paid approximately $119 million more for
power in 2006 alone due to Keyspan's anticompetitive behavior." 6
As for the rest of the state, utilities and their customers paid an
additional $39 million." 7 In response, the DOJ sued KeySpan and
Morgan Stanley for violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act. It
reached a settlement with the two parties, requiring KeySpan and
Morgan Stanley to disgorge $12 million and $4.8 million, respec-
tively, in profits from their anticompetitive behavior.", Even after
factoring in this penalty, KeySpan earned tens of millions of dollars
from its swap arrangement with Morgan Stanley and Astoria.
III. THE MISGUIDED APPLICATION OF THE FILED-RATE DOCTRINE
TO ELECTRICITY MARKETS
In most industries in which market forces set prices, private
parties, whether injured customers or competitors, may bring
treble-damage actions against parties accused of anticompetitive be-
havior under the Sherman Act. 9 Section 1 of the Act governs
anticompetitive conduct by multiple firms, 20 and Section 2 ad-
dresses anticompetitive conduct by a single dominant firm.'
12
Private antitrust enforcement aligns the interests of firms with those
114. See id. ("The Complaint alleges that the Swap eliminated Key[S]pan's incentive to
pursue competitive bidding strategies by allowing it to continue to bid its cap, even though
much of its capacity was unsold.").
115. Id.
116. Letter from AARP to Donna N. Kooperstein, Chief, Trans., Energy, and Agric. Sec-
tion, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, regarding the Public Notice Inviting Tunney Act
Comments in United States v. KeySpan 3 (May 14, 2010), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/
atr/cases/f259700/259704-1 .pdf.
117. Id.
118. KeySpan, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 636; United States v. Morgan Stanley, No. 11 Civ. 6875
(WHP), 2012 WL 3194969, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2012).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006); The Supreme Court has held that indirect purchasers of
goods and services cannot recover damages from antitrust violators under federal antitrust
law. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
120. Id. § 1.
121. Id. § 2.
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of the public. The threat of treble-damage liability helps ensure that
markets reach competitive outcomes, preventing economic harm to
consumers.
Despite the persistent problem of market power in wholesale
power markets, several circuits have immunized generators from
private antitrust suits under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Invoking
the filed-rate doctrine, a legal rule originally developed to bar pri-
vate antitrust enforcement in industries subject to direct price
regulation, courts have held that purchasers of power cannot sue
generators and other participants in wholesale power markets. Fed-
eral courts have reasoned that regulatory oversight is adequate to
create and maintain competitive markets and that antitrust enforce-
ment would interfere with the regulatory scheme.
A. Origins of the Filed-Rate Doctrine
The Supreme Court established the filed-rate doctrine in the
1922 case Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co.122 The plain-
tiff, a manufacturer in St. Paul, Minnesota, shipped its products on
the defendants' railroads. 12 3 It alleged that the defendants had vio-
lated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by agreeing on shipping rates
before submitting them to the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC), the federal agency in charge of regulating the railroad in-
dustry at the time. 24 The plaintiff sought damages to compensate
for the inflated rates and subsequent lost profits. 125
Justice Louis Brandeis, writing for a unanimous Court, held that
the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) immunized railroads from pri-
vate antitrust suits. The Court reasoned that the existence of the
regulatory scheme administered by the ICC eliminated the need for
private antitrust damages on multiple grounds. First, the Court
stated that the need for an antitrust remedy was obviated: the ICC
reviewed rates and could award damages to shippers harmed by
"unreasonably high" or "discriminatory" rates.' 26 Second, it held
122. 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
123. Id. at 159.
124. Id. at 160-61.
125. Id. at 160.
126. See id. at 162 ("A rate is not necessarily illegal because it is the result of a conspiracy
in restraint of trade in violation of the Anti-Trust Act. What rates are legal is determined by
the Act to Regulate Commerce. Under § 8 of the latter act the exaction of any illegal rate
makes the carrier liable to the 'person injured thereby for the full amount of damages sus-
tained in consequence of any such violation' together with a reasonable attorney's fee.
Sections 9 and 16 provide for the recovery of such damages either by complaint before the
Commission or by an action in a federal court. If the conspiracy here complained of had
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that the published rates could not be modified through antitrust,
contract, or tort claims without violating the ICA's prohibition on
discriminatory rates.127 Private parties that recovered damages for
antitrust violations would, in effect, be paying lower rates than simi-
larly situated parties that did not pursue an antitrust action.
28
Third, the plaintiff would have to prove that the effective lower rate
would have conformed to ICA requirements-a determination that
only the ICC could make. 29 Last, it held that the plaintiff's dam-
ages would be speculative due to the lack of a clear
counterfactual-it was uncertain how lower rates would have af-
fected the plaintiffs profits since all its rivals would have also
enjoyed lower rail rates. 130 While foreclosing the possibility of a pri-
vate damages remedy, the Court held that the federal government
could seek injunctive relief, forfeitures, and criminal penalties
against the defendants under the antitrust laws.13'
The Supreme Court affirmed the filed-rate doctrine in its 1986
decision Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., a case
factually similar to Keogh. 32 The plaintiff sought damages from a
group of trucking companies that it alleged had fixed the rates on
freight transportation between the United States and Canada., 33
The members of the Niagara Tariff Bureau had filed their rates
with the ICC, but they had not obtained permission from the ICC
to engage in joint rate setting. 3 4 The district court and the Second
Circuit held the rates were immune from antitrust challenge under
the filed-rate doctrine. 35 In affirming the district court decision
under binding Supreme Court precedent,13 6 Judge Henry Friendly
of the Second Circuit nonetheless questioned the wisdom of the
filed-rate doctrine, especially when the relevant regulator rubber-
resulted in rates which the Commission found to be illegal because unreasonably high or
discriminatory, the full amount of damages sustained, whatever their nature, would have
been recoverable in such proceedings.").
127. Id. at 163.
128. See id. ("If a shipper could recover under § 7 of the Anti-Trust Act for damages re-
sulting from the exaction of a rate higher than that which would otherwise have prevailed,
the amount recovered might, like a rebate, operate to give him a preference over his trade
competitors. It is no answer to say that each of these might bring a similar action under § 7.
Uniform treatment would not result, even if all sued, unless the highly improbable hap-
pened, and the several juries and courts gave to each the same measure of relief.").
129. See id. at 163-64.
130. Id. at 164-65.
131. Id. at 161-62.
132. 476 U.S. 409 (1986).
133. Id. at 412-13.
134. Id. at 413-14.
135. Id. at 414.
136. See Square D Co. v. Niagara Tariff Bureau, Inc., 160 F.2d 1347, 1349 (2d Cir. 1985),
affd, 476 U.S. 409 (1986).
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stamped market rates. He stated that the considerations that had
motivated Justice Brandeis to create the doctrine in Keogh were ar-
guably never valid and certainly not valid when a regulator allows
market forces to set rates. 137 Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for
an eight-justice majority, commended Judge Friendly's critique but
affirmed the sixty-four-year-old doctrine on stare decisis grounds,
holding that only Congress could repeal it.13 Justice Thurgood
Marshall dissented and said the Court should adopt the reasoning
in Judge Friendly's opinion and overrule Keogh.' 39
B. Application of the Doctrine to Power Markets
Several circuits have heard antitrust claims against participants in
wholesale power markets and invoked the filed-rate doctrine to bar
private antitrust damages actions. These courts have not come to a
uniform conclusion as to the doctrine's precise bounds, but they
have all barred claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Some
circuits have used the doctrine to dismiss Section 2 claims; others
have recognized a so-called "competitor exception" to the doctrine
and left open the possibility that firms in power markets can sue
rivals for exclusionary behavior.
In Town of Norwood v. New England Power, the First Circuit pro-
vided a conflicted take on the filed-rate doctrine 40 The plaintiff, a
municipally owned retail electric cooperative, alleged that the de-
fendant, a generation owner, had committed multiple antitrust
violations.' 4' In its complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defen-
dant had fixed prices with rival generation companies in violation
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, engaged in a price squeeze in
violation of Section 2 by providing more favorable wholesale prices
to its retail affiliates, and sold generation assets in violation of Sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act.' 42 The defendant had engaged in this
course of conduct with the approval of FERC and the Massachusetts
and Rhode Island public utility commissions, which were restructur-
ing their respective states' power sectors at the time. 43 The court
observed that FERC still regulated wholesale rates even though
137. See id. at 1352-54 (critiquing Justice Brandeis's reasoning in Keogh).
138. Square D, 476 U.S. at 423-24.
139 Id. at 424-25 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
140. See 202 F.3d 408 (1st Cir. 2000).
141. Id. at 414.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 413-14.
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market forces set them.144 Suggesting that ongoing oversight is not
necessary for the filed-rate doctrine to apply, the court added that
"[i] t is the filing of the tariffs" rather than "any affirmative approval
or scrutiny by the agency" that triggers the doctrine.
145
After reciting how the filed-rate doctrine does not require any
affirmative regulatory supervision to be invoked, the court in Nor-
wood stated that the filed rate doctrine's legal foundations are
"extremely creaky" and proceeded to examine each antitrust claim
at length.1 46 The court dismissed the Section 1 claim on grounds
that the plaintiff mischaracterized an unfavorable customer-sup-
plier contract between itself and the defendant as horizontal price
fixing.147 When it considered the Section 2 price-squeeze claim, the
court noted that finding antitrust liability on the basis of a price
squeeze would interfere with FERC's regulatory scheme and "re-
quire the alteration of [wholesale] tariffs," that FERC had set.148
The plaintiff claimed that its price-squeeze claim should neverthe-
less be allowed to proceed on the basis that it was a rival of the
defendant and thus could invoke the "competitor exception" to the
filed-rate doctrine. 49 The court refused to take a categorical posi-
tion on this exception and instead noted that Norwood was
principally bringing a claim as an aggrieved customer of the defen-
dant. 50 The court also questioned whether the defendant either
had monopoly power in generation or transmission or had engaged
in exclusionary conduct-both of which are required to establish a
Section 2 violation.1 5' It added that if New England Power did have
a transmission monopoly, FERC had the authority to regulate it
under Order 888.152 Finally, the court disputed the merits of the
plaintiff's Section 7 claim but allowed it to proceed, because the
144. See id. at 419 (citations omitted) ("[I1f New England Power's rate were truly left to
the market, with no filing requirement or FERC supervision at all, the filed-rate doctrine
would by its terms no longer operate. But unlike some other regulatory agencies, FERC is still
responsible for ensuring 'just and reasonable' rates and, to that end, wholesale power rates
continue to be filed and subject to agency review.").
145. Id. (emphasis omitted).
146. See id. at 420 ("[T]he law on the filed-rate doctrine is extremely creaky.... Yet this
case is not a good vehicle for considering any cutting back on the doctrine, to whatever
extent Square D permits adjustment, partly because the Sherman Act claims pressed by Nor-
wood are themselves so doubtful.").
147. Id. at 421.
148. Id. at 420 (emphasis omitted).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 420-21.
152. Id. at 421.
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filed-rate doctrine does not foreclose private challenges to anticom-
petitive mergers.1
53
Compared to the First Circuit, the Third Circuit in Utilimax.com,
Inc. v. PPL Energy Plus, LLC expressed little hesitation in applying
the filed-rate doctrine to bar an antitrust claim. 154 The plaintiff was
a competitive retailer, and the defendant was both a competitive
retailer and a generator 55 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant
was the only generator to own excess capacity and used its position
to increase wholesale prices in violation of Section 2 of the Sher-
man Act.156 Without examining the scope of FERC regulation in
electricity markets, the court stated that "a plaintiff may not sue the
supplier of electricity based on rates that, though alleged to be the
result of anticompetitive conduct, were filed with the federal agency
responsible for overseeing such rates." 157 The court noted that the
filed-rate doctrine's competitor exception is recognized in the
Third Circuit. 158 But it ruled that the plaintiff was not eligible for
this exception; it had been injured as a customer of the defen-
dant-paying higher prices for wholesale electricity-rather than as
a competitor. 5 9
The Fifth Circuit, in Texas Commercial Energy, LLC v. TXU Energy
Inc., applied the filed-rate doctrine to bar an antitrust action against
conduct similar to that in Utilimax.160 The plaintiff, a competitive
retailer in Texas, alleged that the defendants, generator owners in
Texas, had increased wholesale electricity prices in February 2003
through manipulative behavior.' 6' The court held that the doctrine
applies even when market forces set prices.6 2 Unlike wholesale
power markets in the rest of the country, which are regulated by
FERC, only the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT) over-
sees the state's market. 63 The court stated that the filed-rate
doctrine still applies when a state regulator, as opposed to a federal
153. Id. at 422.
154. 378 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2004).
155. Id. at 305-06.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 306.
158. Id. at 307.
159. See id. at 307-08 ("The result of Utilimax's inability to buy capacity offered by PPL in
the wholesale market was that it went out of business in the retail market and PPL had one
fewer competitor in that latter market. That result, however, came about because Utilimax
(as a customer of PPL) could not afford to buy capacity. While the ramifications were felt in
its competitor role, the damage to Utilimax occurred because of its status as a customer of
PPL.-).
160. 413 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2005).
161. Id. at 506-07.
162. Id at 509-10.
163. Id. at 506.
[VOL. 46:3
Market Power in Power Markets
regulator, is entrusted with market supervision.' 1 Reciting the par-
ticulars of the PUCT's regulatory scheme, the court suggested that
this oversight is adequate to ensure a well-functioning market.165
The court did not take a position on the competitor exception and
ruled that the issue was moot; the plaintiff was injured in the course
of purchasing power from the defendant.
166
As a result of the California electricity crisis, the Ninth Circuit
has decided multiple antitrust claims in electricity markets and has
consistently applied the filed-rate doctrine to bar plaintiffs from ob-
taining relief. 67 The court has ruled that the filed-rate doctrine
forecloses purchasers of electricity from seeking antitrust and con-
tractual damages due to market manipulation. 68 Recognizing that
the regulation of electricity has changed dramatically, the court has
nevertheless reasoned that the filed-rate doctrine still applies, on
the basis that FERC maintains ongoing supervision of market-based
wholesale prices. The Ninth Circuit has cited FERC's power to
grant and revoke market-based rate authority to generators, obtain
quarterly reports from market participants, and review market
rules, in support of the notion that federal regulation is adequate to
ensure competitive outcomes. 169 It has also emphasized its view that
the judiciary cannot offer satisfactory relief to plaintiffs, suggesting
that courts cannot accurately compute the "fair price" necessary to
determine damages and that such an exercise would interfere with
FERC regulation.
170
164. Id. at 509.
165. See id. at 509-10 (citations omitted) ("[U]nder Bill 7, PUCT is required to ensure
'safe, reliable, and reasonably priced electricity' and 'that ancillary services necessary to facili-
tate the transmission of electric energy are available at reasonable prices with terms and
conditions that are not unreasonably preferential, prejudicial, discriminatory, predatory, or
anticompetitive.' PUC'T also requires electricity to file detailed information to assess market
power and even a market power mitigation plan for those generators that control more than
20% of the electricity market in a specific region. Accordingly, PUCT's oversight over the
market is sufficient to conclude that the BES energy rates are 'filed' within the meaning of
the filed-rate doctrine.").
166. Id. at 510.
167. See, e.g., Wah Chang. v. Duke Energy Trading & Mktg., LLC, 507 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir.
2007); Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County v. Dynegy Power Mktg., Inc., 384 F.3d 756
(9th Cir. 2004); Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Grays Harbor County v. IDACORP Inc., 379 F.3d 641
(9th Cir. 2004).
168. Wah Chang, 507 F.3d at 1228; Snohomish, 384 F.3d at 762; Grays Harbor, 379 F.3d at
651-52.
169. Snohomish, 384 F.3d at 760-61.
170. See id. at 761 (citation omitted) ("We concluded that the district court was precluded
from giving the plaintiff the relief it sought because, to award that relief, the district court
would have had to determine a 'fair price.' We held that this would interfere with FERC's
exclusive jurisdiction to set wholesale rates .... "); Wah Chang, 507 F.3d at 1226 ("Try as it
may, Wah Chang cannot avoid the fact that it seeks what amounts to having the courts deter-
mine what rates the Energy Companies should have charged instead of the rates they did
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The Second Circuit also recently applied the filed-rate doctrine
to bar a private antitrust claim against electricity-market partici-
pants. In 2011, Southern District of New York cited the doctrine to
dismiss a private damages action against KeySpan for its anticompe-
titive behavior in the New York City capacity market.171 The Second
Circuit in September 2012 affirmed the district court's ruling in
favor of the defendant, partly on filed-rate grounds. 72 The court
said that the auction process was "sufficiently safeguarded," citing
FERC's price cap, antimanipulation rule, and investigation into
KeySpan's conduct. 73 Although reaching the same result as its sis-
ter circuits, the court declined to hold that the filed-rate doctrine
categorically bars antitrust claims in electricity markets.1
7 4
C. Theoretical Flaws in the Courts' Rulings
The courts' justifications for applying the filed-rate doctrine to
electricity markets can be distilled into two principal strands. First,
FERC or comparable state regulatory oversight is sufficient to deter
anticompetitive behavior. Second, the judiciary is not capable of
regulating market conduct, suggesting that the judiciary would in-
terfere with FERC and state supervision and would be unable to
compute damages from anticompetitive behavior. If either regula-
tory oversight is adequate to maintain competitive markets or
antitrust litigation cannot remedy anticompetitive behavior without
interfering with the regulatory scheme, courts are justified in bar-
ring antitrust litigation in electricity markets.
Both grounds for invoking the filed-rate doctrine are unsound,
however; its present application in electricity markets is bad pol-
icy.'75 FERC regulatory oversight is not adequate to protect market
competition. For many years, FERC used flawed screening methods
when granting generators the right to sell at market-based rates and
charge. Wah Chang would inevitably drag the courts into a determination of what rate would
be fair and proper.").
171. Simon v. KeySpan Corp., No. 10 Civ. 5437, 2011 WL 2135075 (S.D.N.Y. May 27,
2011).
172. Simon v. KeySpan Corp., 694 F.3d 196, 204 (2d Cir. 2012).
173. Id. at 207.
174. Id. at 204.
175. The application of the filed-rate doctrine in restructured electricity markets has
been widely criticized. See, e.g., Robert B. Martin, III, Sherman Shorts Out: The Dimming ofAnti-
trust Enforcement in the California Electricity Crisis, 55 HASTiNGS LJ. 271, 298-303 (2003); Robert
R. Nordhaus, Electric Power Regulation: Making Partially-Deregulated Markets Wor 54 ADMIN. L.
REv. 365, 381-82 (2002); Rossi, supra note 3, at 1647-48 (2003).
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still relies on imperfect analytical tools. Moreover, FERC cannot ad-
equately deter market manipulation, due to its limited
administrative resources and remedial powers. The extended epi-
sodes of costly anticompetitive conduct in the California and New
York markets have demonstrated these limits too clearly. Second,
courts can remedy anticompetitive behavior without undermining
FERC's regulatory obligation to maintain 'lust and reasonable
rates." In fact, in a market setting, FERC supervision and antitrust
enforcement would work together to create and maintain competi-
tive wholesale power markets. Since neither justification can
withstand scrutiny, the filed-rate doctrine's present application is
not defensible.
1. FERC and RTO Regulation Are Not Adequate to
Ensure Competitive Markets
The courts' reasoning that FERC supervision is sufficient to pre-
serve competitive electricity markets is flawed. First, the Agency
relies on problematic screens in determining whether generators
can sell at market rates. Second, even if it were to use a more strin-
gent market-power test, FERC has limited resources and remedial
powers and cannot realistically prevent all instances of anticompeti-
tive behavior.
In granting generators market-based rate authority in the 1990s,
FERC used a flawed model of electricity markets. This model relied
on market shares of uncommitted generation capacity-that is, ca-
pacity not sold under long-term contracts. 176 It assumed that
transmission congestion never arose and that generators always
competed in a wide geographic market. 177 If a generator had a
share of 20 percent or less in this broad market at peak load, FERC
granted it the authority to sell at market prices.1 78 Generators that
had a share in excess of 20 percent could still obtain market-based
rate authority if they offered evidence showing that they did not
have market power.17 9 Otherwise, they would have to sell their
power at cost-based rates.180 Since transmission congestion can and
176. See James Bohn et al., The Design of Tests for Horizontal Market Power in Market-Based
Rate Proceedings, 15 ELEcmIcrfyJ., May 2002, at 52, 53-54.
177. Helman, supra note 19, at 885 ("Transmission constraints between these markets
were not considered.").
178. Bohn et al., supra note 176, at 53-54.
179. Id,
180. See Craig R. Roach, Measuring Market Power in the U.S. Electricity Business, 23 ENERGY
L.J. 51, 61 (2002).
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does divide a large geographic market into several smaller markets
for a significant fraction of the time,181 ignoring constraints on the
grid was a serious deficiency. For example, a large single market
during the low demand hours of the early morning may fragment
into smaller markets as demand rises and causes congestion on
transmission lines. Within one of these smaller geographic markets,
a generator could have a market share greater than 20 percent and
exercise market power. Yet FERC's model would allow this genera-
tor to sell its power at market prices so long as it had a share equal
to or less than 20 percent in the larger geographic market.
While FERC-to its credit-has since adopted more sophisti-
cated screening methods that take into account transmission
constraints, 1 2 these tests continue to have important limitations.
Generators that can establish that they have a share less than a spec-
ified threshold in the relevant market and that they are not
pivotal-that is, not necessary to meet peak demand-can sell their
power at market prices.8 3 A generator that fails either test can still
obtain market-based rate authority if it shows market concentration
is below a certain threshold in the problematic markets. 84 The
characteristics of electricity markets create both supply and de-
mand inelasticity. Due to this supply-and-demand-side insensitivity
to price, market shares and concentration are not a good proxy for
whether a generator has market power.85 A generator with even a
small share may be able to withhold output to raise prices and in-
crease its profits. 8 6 The pivotality test, which looks at whether a
181. See, e.g., U.S. DPT. OF ENERGY, NATIONAL ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION CONGESTION STUDY
45 (2009) ("As a result of transmission congestion and losses, there was considerable varia-
tion in clearing prices across the [New York] system. In the day-ahead market, eastern up-
state prices were 27% higher than average prices in western New York, New York City prices
were 8% higher than average prices in the eastern up-state region, and Long Island prices
were 22% higher than average prices in the eastern up-state region."); id. at 83 ("CAISO
reports that sources of intra-zonal congestion within Southern California included .. the
Southwest Powerlink corridor, which includes the Imperial Valley and Miguel transmission
stations. Miguel is the choke point for transmission from Mexico and Arizona to load in
Southern California.").
182. Helman, supra note 19, at 885.
183. See Richard Gilbert & David Newbery, Market Power in US and EUElectricity Generation,
in ANTITRUST AND REGULATION IN THE EU AND US: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PERSPECITvEs 161-62
(Fran _ois Lkveque & Howard Shelanski eds., 2009).
184. Helman, supra note 19, at 887.
185. Severn Borenstein et al., Market Power in Electricity Markets: Beyond Concentration Mea-
sures, 20 ENERGYJ. no. 4, 1999, at 65, 68.
186. See id. ("Even though one firm may have a relatively small market share at a given
demand level, it may be the case that if that firm reduced output, no other firm would be
able to replace that supply because of cost, capacity or transmission constraints.").
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particular generator is necessary to meet peak demand, better re-
flects the dynamics of power markets. 18 7 But it may still understate
the likelihood that market power can be exercised jointly 88
Beyond the limitations of its prospective market power screens,
FERC does not have the resources to protect power markets from
collusive behavior after generators have been granted market-based
rate authority. Given how the features of electricity markets make
them vulnerable to manipulation, constant vigilance against the ex-
ercise of unilateral or collective exercise of market power is
critical. 8 9 The bodies at FERC and the RTOs responsible for this
oversight, however, have comparatively small staffs. FERC has over
100 employees in its Office of Market Oversight and Investiga-
tion, 190 and the RTOs have mostly outsourced market monitoring
duties to small, specialized consulting firms.19' It is unrealistic to
expect even these knowledgeable and experienced regulators to
ferret out all instances of anticompetitive market behavior.
When FERC does uncover anticompetitive market behavior, it
has only imperfect remedial tools to correct it. FERC's most potent
remedies are disgorging profits from a generator's anticompetitive
behavior and suspending its market-based rate authority.192 An-
ticompetitive behavior is not always detected and sometimes goes
unpunished. Disgorgement is inadequate for optimal deterrence, 93
187. See Gilbert & Newbery, supra note 183, at 162 (footnote omitted) ("An applicant
passes the pivotal supplier test if its uncommitted capacity is less than the uncommitted ca-
pacity reserve margin. If an applicant passes the pivotal supplier test, the market has
sufficient capacity to meet demand even if the market makes no sales. An applicant that fails
the pivotal supplier test can demand a price above the competitive level and be assured of
making some sales.").
188. See id. ("The pivotal supplier test can be strengthened in straightforward ways to
reduce the probability that a generator would be permitted to exercise market power. The
PJM Interconnection employs a three-pivotal supplier test to determine when generators are
reasonably likely to behave in a competitive manner.").
189. Seth A. Blumsack et al., Lessons from the Failure of U.S. Electricity Restructuring, ELaG-
mlcrrvJ., Mar. 2006, at 15, 29 ("FERC and the states should not be naive in thinking that
small changes in a regulated market, or in the restructured markets, will lead to the sort of
vigorous competition that has characterized the deregulated airline, trucking, and telecom-
munications industries. The successful restructured markets rely on close monitoring and
ordering generators to engage in behavior such as providing reactive power or providing
electricity at cost.").
190. Frank A. Wolak, Lessons from International Experience with Electricity Market Monitoring 7
(World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3692, 2005).
191. See, e.g., RTO MARKET MONITORING, POTOMAC ECONOMICS, http://www.
potomaceconomics.com/practice areas/rtomarket (last visited Oct. 23, 20120); OuR Rort
As PJM MARKET MONITOR, MONITORING ANALmrICS, http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/
company/role.shtml (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
192. Kelliher, supra note 63, at 19, 22.
193. See Darren Bush & Carrie Mayne, In (Reluctant) Defense of Enron: Why Bad Regulation Is
to Blame for California's Power Woes (or Why Antitrust Law Fails to Protect Against Market Power
When the Market Rules Encourage Its Use), 83 OR. L. Rav. 207, 282 (2004).
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for which the expected value of the penalty must equal the harm to
society from the conduct.' 94 Generators may often be able to exer-
cise market power with impunity and know that at worst they will
have to give up their ill-gotten gains. Imagine if the only penalty
thieves faced was to return the goods or money they stole. Thieves
are not always caught, and so this remedy would create insufficient
deterrence. On average, theft would pay.
In contrast, suspending market-based rate authority is a poten-
tially serious penalty. Selling power at cost-based rates may
significantly reduce future profits.195  This penalty, however,
removes a player from the wholesale market, and in punishing one
bad actor, may ironically short-circuit the larger process of creating
competition.196
2. The Threat of Institutional Conflict Does Not Justify the
Present Filed-Rate Immunity
a. Private antitrust enforcement would generally complement FERC's
regulatory mission
In applying the filed-rate doctrine, the courts have ignored how
the antitrust laws would operate electricity markets. FERC no
longer sets wholesale rates. Some markets have price caps, but even
here, market forces are given free play under those ceilings. There
are no longer fixed rates like those at issue in Keogh. In fact, one of
the defining features of electricity markets is the volatility of prices
even in a twenty-four hour period-the antithesis of fixed rates.
97
Aside from special cases like the essential facilities doctrine, 98
antitrust alms to preserve a competitive process free of harmful col-
lusion and exclusion by imposing damages on defendants found
194. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111
HARv. L. REv. 869, 957-62 (1998). Moreover, the Supreme Court has held under the Mobile-
Sierra doctrine that FERC can set aside market rates only if it shows "unequivocal public
necessity." See Morgan Stanley Capital Gr., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. I of Snohomish Co.,
Wash., 128 S. Ct. 2733 (2008); NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Maine Public Utils. Comm'n, 130 S.
Ct. 693 (2010).
195. See Rossi, supra note 3, at 1628 ("To the extent that grounds for revocation can be
established, the remedy is draconian: nationwide in scope (thus excessively harsh in its conse-
quence), harmful to consumers to the extent it over-deters, and costly for regulators.").
196. See Diana L. Moss, Electricity and Market Power: Current Issues for Restncturing Markets (A
Survey), I ErivrL. & ENo-cv L. & POL'YJ., 11, 38 (2005).
197. See supra Part 1IIi.
198. The essential facilities doctrine requires natural monopolies to grant competitors in
related markets access to monopoly assets deemed "critical facilities." See genera/ly Sandeep
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liable for anticompetitive conductt 99 The norm of antitrust is not to
dictate market outcomes or terms of dealing by firms.200 The legal
regime proscribes certain conduct rather than prescribe affirmative
responsibilities. The concern that antitrust litigation would require
the prospective "alteration of tariffs," 21 and thus interfere with reg-
ulated rates, does not apply. Since Norwood, in fact, plaintiffs have
typically alleged that defendants engaged in conduct resembling
collusion.20 2 If the courts had allowed the claims to proceed, they
would not have created any conflict with FERC rules. Rather, the
courts would have supplemented FERC's regulatory objective of
creating competitive power markets free from conduct like
collusion.
2 03
Both FERC regulations and antitrust law seek to encourage mar-
ket competition and discourage collusion. FERC does this through
its market-based rate and merger-review authority and its power to
order generators engaging in anticompetitive conduct to disgorge
profits. Antitrust litigation would supplement this regulatory mis-
sion through the threat of imposing treble damages on generators
that collude.20 4 Given the resource and remedial constraints that
FERC faces, the risk of private antitrust liability may be vital to de-
terring anticompetitive behavior. As in many other areas of law in
the United States and markets subject to full antitrust enforcement,
private plaintiffs would serve as "private attorneys general" and of-
fer market oversight not tied to budgetary choices or regulatory
Vaheesan, Reviving an Epithet: A New Way Forward for the Essential Facilities Doctrine, 2010 UTAH
L. REv. 911.
199. See Dennis W. Carlton & Randal C. Picker, Antitrust and Regulation 14-15 (Nat'l Bu-
reau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12902, 2007).
200. See Martin, supra note 175, at 301 (footnote omitted) ("[11n [S]ection I actions aris-
ing from the crisis, a court need not determine whether the hypothetical rate would fit
FERC's standards; instead, the court need only estimate what electricity prices would have
been absent anticompetitive conduct. A court would use that estimate for calculating dam-
ages, and nothing more. Such an estimate would inevitably be lower, thus running little risk
it might be contrary to FERC's 'ust and reasonable' mandate.'").
201. Town of Norwood v. New England Power Co., 202 F.3d 408, 420 (1st Cir. 2000).
202. See, e.g., Tex. Comm. Energy v. TXU Energy, Inc., 413 F.3d 503, 506-07 (5th Cir.
2005); Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County v. Dynegy Power Mktg., Inc., 384 F.3d 756,
759 (9th Cir. 2004); Simon v. KeySpan, 10 Civ. 5437 (SAS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57142, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2011).
203. See Order Revising Market-Based Rate Tariffs and Authorizations, FERC, at 10, available at
http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/021606/E-4.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2012)
(emphasis added) ("[P]rohibited actions in Rule 2 (i.e., wash trades, transactions predicated
on submitting false information, transactions creating and relieving artificial congestion, and
collusion for the purpose of market manipulation) are all prohibited activities under new section
lc.2 of our regulations and are subject to sanctions and remedial action.").
204. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
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enforcement priorities.2 5 They would serve as additional "eyes on
the ground" and could uncover and remedy instances of anticom-
petitive behavior that FERC and state regulators do not.
20 6
Courts would be much more justified in exercising judicial re-
straint over antitrust issues involving prospective price setting and
ongoing supervision. In the area of transmission access, for exam-
ple, price and other terms of grid use need to be set. Given its
expertise, FERC is more suited for this role than the courts.
20 7
FERC is also better equipped to ensure compliance with access
rules.208 Courts would thus be wise to invoke the filed-rate doctrine
or other comparable antitrust immunity in deciding cases about dis-
criminatory transmission access and similar allegations. This rule
would prevent judicial interference in an area more suited to regu-
latory resolution.
Some courts, in recognizing the "competitor exception" to the
filed-rate doctrine, have turned these institutional considerations
on their head. The Third Circuit in Utilimax stated that competitor
suits do not trigger the filed-rate doctrine, asserting that competi-
tors are not the "intended beneficiaries" of regulation.2 0 9 This
formalistic approach ignores the operation of regulation in electric-
ity (and network industries generally) today. Contrary to the Third
Circuit's reasoning, public utility regulation today is directed to-
ward facilitating competition rather than setting final prices to
consumers-in effect, competitors of incumbents are now the im-
mediate "intended beneficiaries" of regulation. 210 To allow for
wholesale-market competition, FERC issued Order 888 to ensure
that all generators have non-discriminatory access to the transmis-
sion grid, which otherwise functions as a natural monopoly. Courts
like the Third Circuit, however, have left open the possibility that
205. Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in
the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. Rav. 1384, 1413 (2000).
206. Id.
207. See Carlton & Picker, supra note 199, at 29; Rossi, supra note 3, at 1610.
208. See Carlton & Picker, supra note 199, at 29; Rossi, supra note 3, at 1610.
209. Utilimax.com, Inc. v. PPL Energy Plus, LLC, 378 F.3d 303, 307 (3d Cir. 2004).
210. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1323, 1364 (1998) ("[T]he great concern is that incumbent
providers that control bottleneck facilities will use their monopoly power to discriminate
against competitors in the service segments that have been opened to competition. To pre-
vent this from happening, a new set of regulatory obligations-including the duty to
interconnect, to lease unbundled network elements, and to sell services for resale-is im-
posed on the owners of such bottleneck facilities and becomes the focal point of regulatory
attention. In effect, the owners of natural monopoly facilities assume new common carrier
duties toward their competitors, and these duties are regarded as more important than those
they owe to their traditional customers.").
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independent generators can ask the federal courts to resolve dis-
putes over access to transmission. These issues involve prospective
price setting and regulatory supervision-tasks for which the judici-
ary is comparatively ill suited and at a strong disadvantage vis-A-vis
industry regulators.2 1 1 The competitor exception thus forces judges
to resolve disputes that are well outside their area of competence.
b. Courts are capable of computing a retrospective "fair price"
Contrary to the institutional pessimism expressed by the Ninth
Circuit, the courts can compute a "fair price" that would have pre-
vailed but for alleged anticompetitive behavior. As described
earlier, rather than forcing courts to become industry regulators,
the antitrust laws operate on the premise that treble-damage awards
for past violations significantly deter future violations.212 Courts rely
on several proven methods to compute the retrospective competi-
tive price-a task that is simplified by the mechanical price-setting
algorithm in centralized power markets. To approximate damages
from anticompetitive market behavior, courts compare the prices
that prevailed during the period of anticompetitive conduct with
the prices that would have prevailed but for the anticompetitive be-
havior.213 As is often the case with counterfactuals, it is not easy to
determine precisely how things would have alternately played out,
competitive universe. To resolve this difficulty, courts have used five
methods, jointly or independently, to estimate the "competitive
price":
(1) prices that existed before the start of the antitrust viola-
tion or any other period without collusion;
(2) prices in a comparable market in which the antitrust viola-
tion did not occur;
(3) average total costs, which should well approximate prices
in a competitive market;
(4) variable costs multiplied by the margin in noncollusive pe-
riods; or
211. See Carlton & Picker, supra note 199, at 29; Rossi, supra note 3, at 1610.
212. See Robert H. Lande, Five Myths About Antitrust Damages, 40 U.S.F. L. Rav. 651,
652-57 (2006).
213. John M. Connor, Forensic Economics: An Introduction with Special Emphasis on Price Fix-
ing, 4J. COMPETITON L. & EcoN., 31 44-45 (2007).
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(5) econometric models that estimate the price elevation ef-
fect of the collusive agreement.
21 4
The difference between actual prices and these "but-for" prices is
the measure of per-unit damages.
215
Furthermore, in the context of electricity markets, computing
the "but-for" price is a simpler administrative task than it is in most
industries. In competitive, centralized electricity markets, prices are
set through a process akin to a Dutch auction: the marginal cost of
the most expensive unit needed to meet hourly demand sets the
price for the entire market.21 6 The price of power that would have
prevailed in each hour under competitive market conditions can be
computed based on the cost of fuel, the technical characteristics of
generators, transmission-line-capacity limits, and hourly demand.217
This is a data-intensive process that requires the testimony of econo-
mists. Yet, it is hardly novel, as economic experts perform data
analysis in many matters that courts decide.218
Finally, in contrast to instances in which regulators set prices pro-
spectively, computing retrospective damages with complete
accuracy is not as critical. The purpose of damages is to deter future
antitrust violations and compensate victims. Particularly in the con-
text of price fixing and other forms of collusion between horizontal
rivals, the risk of overdeterrence is nonexistent. 219 Unlike other
forms of economic behavior that can have both anticompetitive and
procompetitive effects, collusion does not have procompetitive ben-
efits, so excessive deterrence is not a practical concern. 2 0
IV. WHY ELIMINATING THE FILED-RATE DOCTRINE Is NOT
SUFFICIENT TO CREATE COMPETITIVE POWER MARKETS
Congress or the Supreme Court can promote competitive power
markets and more affordable electricity by limiting application of
214. Id. at 46-51, 53-54.
215. Id. at 44-45.
216. Green, supra note 28, at 246.
217. Jeffrey Bastian et al., Forecasting Energy Prices in a Competitive Market, 12 IEEE COM-
PUTER APPLICATIONS IN POWER 40, 42-44 (1999).
218. See, e.g., Robert Thornton & John Ward, The Economist in Tort Litigation, 13J. ECON.
PERsP. 101, 101-02 (1999); Thomas R. Ireland, The Interface Between Law and Economics and
Forensic Economics, 7J. LEGAL ECON. 60, 65 (1997).
219. See Jonathan B. Baker, New Horizons in Cartel Detection, 69 Gpo. WASH. L. REv. 824,
826 (2001); Robert H. Lande, Why Antitrust Damage Levels Should Be Raised, 16 LoY. CONSUMER
L. REv. 329, 333-34 (2003).
220. See EINER RZ ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERAIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS
105-06 (2007).
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the filed-rate doctrine to exclusionary conduct.221 The filed rate
doctrine should not bar antitrust suits alleging collusive behavior in
the industry. The distinction between collusive and exclusionary
conduct offers guidance on how the filed rate doctrine should be
applied in electricity markets. Courts have the ability to remedy col-
lusive conduct through damage awards but are much less
competent at addressing exclusionary conduct that involves trans-
mission access.2 22 A sensible legal rule would recognize this
distinction. On the one hand, purchasers of power should have all
the usual antitrust remedies against generators accused of collu-
sion. On the other hand, market participants that allege
exclusionary conduct like discriminatory access to transmission
should face the filed-rate bar or similar immunity and instead be
directed to seek relief from the industry experts at FERC.
The KeySpan episode in New York City shows how private anti-
trust enforcement could promote competitive power markets.
FERC failed to prevent or remedy a two-year period of anticompeti-
tive behavior that likely cost ratepayers more than $100 million and
did not pursue any enforcement action after it learned of the mis-
conduct.223 Notably, in its public statements, the Department of
Justice suggested that it pursued disgorgement-a rarely used rem-
edy in public antitrust enforcement 224-against KeySpan because
the filed-rate doctrine barred private damages actions.225 Given the
imperfect ability to detect collusion, even full disgorgement of
221. With a divided Congress and a Supreme Court hostile to antitrust, the likelihood of
this development appears slim. See KENNETH M. DAVIDSON, REALTY IGNORED: How MILTON
FRIEDMAN AND CHICAGO ECONOMICS UNDERMINED AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS AND ENDANGERED
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 102-03 (2011) ("The last victory for an antitrust plaintiff in the Su-
preme Court was in 1993. The scorecard in the Supreme Court reads, according to my
colleagues at the American Antitrust Institute as I am writing on February 26, 2009, 19 victo-
ries for antitrust defendants and 0 victories for antitrust plaintiffs.... In the 2010 American
Needle case, the Supreme Court decided a case in favor of an antitrust plaintiff for the first
time since 1992.").
222. See Carlton & Picker, supra note 199, at 29 ("In an industry that becomes partially
deregulated, antitrust can be used to control the unregulated segments, while regulation
controls the rest. Indeed, partial deregulation of an industry can increase the importance to
a rival's survival of rules of interconnection.").
223. See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, FINDINGS OF A NoN-PUBLIC INVESTIGATION OF
POTENTIAL MARKET MANIPULATION BY SUPPLIERS IN THE NEW YORK CITY CAPACrY MARKET 3
(2008) (noting that because FERC enforcement staff had "not found any evidence that
KeySpan ... violated the NYISO's Service Tariff or Part Ic of the Commission's regulations"
the investigation would be closed absent Commission action.)
224. Einer Elhauge, Disgorgement as an Antitrust Remedy, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 79, 81 (2009).
225. Competitive Impact Statement at 9, United States v. KeySpan Corp., 763 F. Supp. 2d
633 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 10-cv-1415).
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gains from anticompetitive behavior inadequately deters such con-
duct.226 Private antitrust suits would allow direct purchasers of
power to recover the overcharges they paid (and more after treb-
ling) and strongly deter future anticompetitive behavior.
Although the present application of the filed-rate doctrine is
problematic and allows some types of market misconduct to go un-
punished, the actual benefits of a judicial or legislative repeal or
limitation of the doctrine should not be overstated. The KeySpan
episode shows how restricting the scope of the filed-rate doctrine
can produce better market outcomes. The threat of private anti-
trust damages actions could have deterred what amounted to
explicit collusion between rival generators. Express collusion be-
tween generators, however, is not the sole or even primary reason
why restructuring the industry has not delivered the promised con-
sumer benefits. Two important forms of anticompetitive market
behavior-unilateral withholding and tacit collusion-are permissi-
ble and difficult to prosecute, respectively, under long-standing
interpretations of the antitrust laws. In other words, the antitrust
laws do not proscribe the entire universe of anticompetitive con-
duct that occurs in electricity markets.
A. The Exercise of Unilateral Market Power Is Not Proscribed
by the Sherman Act
Today, Section 2 of the Sherman Act does not prohibit dominant
firms from charging whatever price the market can bear.227 Compa-
nies with monopoly power do not violate the Sherman Act unless
that power is maintained or extended through some exclusionary
act. At times, Congress and the courts have considered using Sec-
tion 2 to attack the mere existence of monopoly power. In 1976,
Senator Philip Hart proposed expanding Section 2 to deconcen-
trate industries marked by durable monopoly power.228 This and
similar proposals garnered significant attention but were never en-
acted. In his famed opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, Judge Learned Hand raised the possibility of "no-fault" mo-
nopolization.2 29 He rejected such a rule, though, stating that "[tlhe
successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be
226. See Bush & Mayne, supra note 41, at 282 n.353.
227. I11A PHILLip E. AREEDA & HERBERT HovFNKAMP, ANTrmusT LAW § 720a (3d ed.
2008).
228. William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the
Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REv. 1105, 1127 (1989).
229. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
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turned upon when he wins."230 Since the mid-1960s, the Supreme
Court has held that excluding rivals and possessing monopoly
power are both necessary elements for establishing a monopoliza-
tion claim.23
The charging of high prices is arguably an important part of the
competitive dynamic. In theory, high prices in a market, while im-
posing short-term pain on consumers, should attract new entry and
help reallocate scarce resources toward high-value uses and away
from low-value ones in the long run.2 3 2 The Supreme Court has
taken this idea to an extreme in recent years. In its controversial
ruling in Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko,
LLP, the Supreme Court asserted in dicta that "[t] he opportunity to
charge monopoly prices-at least for a short period-is what at-
tracts 'business acumen' in the first place; it induces risk taking that
produces innovation and economic growth."2 33 Although this may
be an empirically dubious position, the Court has thus treated the
ability to charge high prices as an essential part of the market dy-
namic-the antithesis of the no-fault monopolization position.
Even when viewing the hyperbolic dicta of Trinko with skepticism,
high prices also play an important role in electricity markets. High
prices signal to investors when, where, and what type of new genera-
tion needs to be constructed.2
3 4
Due to long-standing reading of the Sherman Act, generators
that economically or physically withhold electricity from the market
do not automatically violate Section 2. They can thus reduce their
output to increase their own profits and effect large wealth transfers
from consumers. While such conduct may run afoul of RTO rules
and other state and federal laws, it does not violate Section 2 under
its present judicial articulation.2 35 If, for example, power purchasers
had sued TXU in the wake of its anticompetitive conduct in the
230. Id. at 430.
231. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
232. AREEDA & HOvENKAmP, supra note 227, at § 720a.
233. 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004).
234. See Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft, The Convergence of Market Designs for Adequate Gener-
ating Capacity with Special Attention to the CAISO's Resource Adequacy Problem 10-11 (Ctr. For
Energy and Environmental Policy Research, Working Paper No. 06-007, 2006) (explaining
how price caps intended to control the exercise of market power can prevent high-cost plants
needed to meet peak demand from earning revenues necessary to cover their fixed costs).
235. The FTC, under Section 5 of the FrCA, could, in theory, try to seek injunctive relief
against firms that exercise monopoly power. See William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Compe-
tition Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 AN-rrrusr L.J.
929, 930 (2010) ("Congress intended Section 5 to be a mechanism for upgrading the U.S.
system of competition law by permitting the FTC to reach behavior not necessarily pro-
scribed by the other U.S. competition statutes, including the 1890 Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act.").
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summer of 2005 had overcome the filed-rate doctrine, they likely
would have not obtained antitrust damages. By all appearances,
TXU was only exercising its own market power, and did not engage
in conduct that excluded rivals from competing against it on a level
playing field.23 6 Likewise, based on the allegations in Utilimax,237 the
plaintiff would not have been able to obtain damages even in the
absence of the filed-rate doctrine. The plaintiff alleged that the de-
fendant had exercised its monopoly power but had made no
suggestion that this monopoly power was obtained through exclu-
sionary or other improper conduct.2 38 Even the California crisis
appears to be the result of generators unilaterally maximizing their
individual profits rather than colluding.23 9 Assuming the filed-rate
doctrine had not been applied, private antitrust suits likely still
could not have remedied this extended period of market miscon-
duct, which allowed producers to capture billions of dollars from
consumers.
B. Tacit Collusion Is Often Beyond the Reach of the Sherman Act
Tacit collusion, also known as conscious parallelism, in oligo-
polistic industries has been one of the most intractable problems in
antitrust law. It involves firms setting supracompetitive prices with-
out any overt agreement or direct communication between them.24
In oligopolistic markets, the profits of firms are dependent on the
236. See POTOMAC ECONOMICS, supra note 99, at 27 ("TXU offered only 58.9 percent of its
dispatchable energy at prices within $50 of its estimated [short-run marginal cost] on average
during these intervals in the Study Period. Overall, TXU was a pivotal supplier during 84.3
percent of the price spike intervals. When a supplier is pivotal, some portion of the balancing
energy demand must be satisfied by that supplier. Hence, TXU's offers in the balancing
market during the price spike intervals were often priced substantially higher than competi-
tive levels, resulted in significantly less balancing energy from TXU being deployed and,
therefore, constituted economic withholding of production.").
237. See Utilimax, 378 F.3d at 306 ("According to Utilimax's complaint, during the first
quarter of 2001 PPL was the only entity that had excess capacity available that Utilimax could
purchase to satisfy its capacity obligations. Thus, under the regulatory system described
above, PPL was able to ensure that it received the (capacity deficiency rate] for its excess
energy either by offering it for sale in the daily auction market at the CDR price or by simply
collecting CDR revenues from any retail supplier that failed to meet its capacity obligations.
According to Utilimax, PPL engaged in these practices during the first quarter of 2001. As a
result of this conduct, CDR revenues during that quarter were $11,767,541, compared to
CDR revenues of $1,000 or less during the fourth quarter of 2000. PPL received almost all of
the CDR revenues for the first quarter of 2001.").
238. See id. at 308.
239. See Puller, supra note 87, at 85; Wolak, supra note 87, at 430.
240. See Rees, supra note 51, at 27-28.
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expected behavior of their rivals.24' Because of this strategic interac-
tion, smaller players may, for example, recognize it is in their self-
interest to follow the prices of a market leader, all without ever
directly communicating with each other.2 42 The result may be to
mimic the price effects of a cartel without any overt communica-
tion-let alone agreement-between participating firms.
243
Noted antitrust scholars have debated what to do about tacit col-
lusion in oligopolistic markets. Donald Turner, the head of the
Antitrust Division at the Department of Justice in the Kennedy Ad-
ministration and then-author of the leading antitrust treatise,
thought that tacit collusion was a common problem in concen-
trated markets in the mid-twentieth century.24 He argued, however,
that there is no satisfactory remedy for tacit collusion under Section
1-how could courts enjoin firms from ignoring the pricing deci-
sions of their rivals?245 He said that courts should not impose
Section 1 liability for tacit collusion "without more in the way of
'agreement' than is found in 'conscious parallelism."'2 46 Instead, he
called on using Section 2 of the Sherman Act to reduce market
concentration in oligopolistic markets as a means of addressing per-
sistent tacit collusion.
247
Judge Richard Posner has presented a contrasting view, arguing
that tacit collusion is not as prevalent as Turner claimed. According
to Posner, tacit collusion is not an inevitable feature of oligopolistic
markets; industry characteristics and practices often create strong
incentives for undercutting the collusive price.248 As a consequence,
Posner has said that tacit collusion is a product of "voluntary behav-
ior" and should be addressed under Section 1.249 Thus, in his view,
241. Dennis A. Yao & Susan S. DeSanti, Game Theory and the Legal Analysis of Tacit Collu-
sion, 38 ArrrnusT BuLL. 113, 115-16 (1993).
242. SeeJonathan B. Baker, 7wo Sherman Act Section I Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly
Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST Buu.. 143, 186-87 (1993).
243. See William E. Kovacic et al., Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MIcH. L.
Rv. 393, 395 (2010).
244. See Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Par-
allelism and Refusals toDea4 75 HAv. L. REv. 655, 662 (1962) ("[H]ere and there an industry
seems to resemble almost perfectly the book case of pure oligopoly; and in many instances,
price competition seems much less vigorous than one would expect from a truly competitive
industry, erupting only sporadically and then only under rather heavy pressures of excess
capacity and the like.").
245. Id. at 669.
246. Id. at 671.
247. Donald F. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82
HARv. L. REv. 1207, 1231 (1960).
248. Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L.
Rsv. 1562, 1566-69 (1969).
249. Id. at 1578.
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courts should look to market conduct and price effects in determin-
ing whether firms have colluded tacitly.2 50 Regarding appropriate
remedies, Posner endorsed the use of private damages, civil and
criminal penalties, and, in exceptional cases, divestitures but re-
jected judicial regulation of pricing behavior.
251
The courts have generally followed the Turner approach to tacit
collusion. Although tacit collusion is not categorically legal under
the antitrust laws, plaintiffs still face significant evidentiary hurdles
in bringing a successful claim. The Supreme Court has long held
that mere parallel behavior is legal under the antitrust laws.2 52 To
establish an agreement under Section 1, the plaintiff must show the
existence of "plus factors" in addition to the existence of parallel
market conduct.2 53 The courts have not enumerated an exhaustive
list of these factors, but some have been used repeatedly to establish
liability in parallel conduct cases. An anticompetitive arrangement
may be inferred if there is (1) proof that rivals did or could have
communicated directly, (2) evidence of anticompetitive intent be-
hind the parallel conduct, (3) behavior so complex as to be unlikely
to occur without detailed communication among rivals, or (4) be-
havior that is unlikely to be rational in the absence of an
agreement. 254 The 2007 Supreme Court decision Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly raised the hurdles for plaintiffs trying to bring a success-
ful tacit collusion claim.2 55 It held that a defendant's motion to
dismiss in a conscious parallelism case must be granted unless a
plaintiff can plausibly allege plus factors at the prediscovery stage in
litigation.2
56
Given the present state of antitrust jurisprudence, tacit collusion
in electricity markets may be persistent and yet incurable under the
Sherman Act. The transparent pricing and repeated game nature
of centralized wholesale power markets may simplify collusion
among generators in RTO regions.2 57 The threat of quick detection
and punishment make defection from such arrangements less prof-
itable and consequently less likely than in other industries .258 Tacit
collusion in an industry conducive to it may make actual agreement
on price or output unnecessary. 25 9 This is an important virtue from
250. See id. at 1578-83 (listing economic indicia that suggest tacit collusion).
251. Id. at 1589-91.
252. See Theatre Enter., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954).
253. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 765 (1984).
254. Baker, supra note 242, at 176-77; see also Kovacic et al., supra note 243, at 405-06.
255. 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
256. Id.
257. See Macatangay, supra note 52, at 258-60; Blumsack et al., supra note 189, at 18-20.
258. Macatangay, supra note 52, at 259-60.
259. See Baker, supra note 242, at 190.
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the perspective of suppliers. Even with the filed-rate doctrine, elec-
tricity market participants who engage in more overt forms of
collusion face the risk of civil and criminal prosecution by the gov-
ernment.26 Generators may thus be able to engage in persistent
parallel pricing above competitive levels without triggering any of
the plus factors that could invite legal liability.
V. CREATING BETTER MARKET STRUCTURES TO REDEEM THE
PROMISE OF INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING
Given the unlikelihood of the filed-rate doctrine being re-
pealed-and the practical limitations of private antitrust
enforcement in electricity markets even if it were-state and federal
regulators must play the lead role in fostering competitive electric-
ity markets. Regulators should focus on creating market structures
that are conducive to competition. Specifically, they should apply
stricter standards to generator mergers and enjoin those that are
likely to enhance market power, facilitate the construction of new
transmission interconnections, and promote the adoption of de-
mand-side response programs.
Market monitors should remain vigilant, but intrusive regulatory
oversight of markets has serious limitations and raises questions
about the very purpose of restructuring. Monitoring and modifying
market outcomes may have unintended consequences and can un-
dermine the rationale of industry restructuring. Market monitors
cannot always distinguish high prices that reflect genuinely inade-
quate supply from high prices that arise from the exercise of
market power.261 A market monitor that alters market outcomes in
the former case may be suppressing the price signals necessary to
encourage the development of additional generation.2 62 A regula-
tory approach centered on market monitoring also raises a more
fundamental issue. What is the purpose of restructuring if it merely
260. See Kovacic et al., supra note 243, at 394.
261. See Paul L. Joskow, Lessons Learned form Electricity Market Liberalization, 9 ENERGY J. 9,
23 (2008) ("[M]arket power mitigation programs may be too aggressive, constraining prices
from rising to competitive levels when demand is high, capacity is fully utilized, and competi-
tive market prices should reflect scarcity values that exceed the price caps in place. Thus,
these efforts to mitigate market power in the short run may create adverse generation invest-
ment incentives in the long run . . . ."); see also Helman, supra note 19, at 891 ("The major
problem is that because market power of generators in load pockets can potentially affect
many hours of the year, the market power mitigation rules have been restrictive and, in
combination with other elements of market design, may have dampened the locational en-
ergy price excessively, precluding well-functioning market pricing mechanisms for recovering
scarcity rents or long-term fixed costs.").
262. Id.
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replaces one form of detailed oversight (cost-of-service regulation)
with another (market-based rates requiring constant monitoring)
without necessarily creating public benefits?
265
A. Strengthening Merger Enforcement (and Considering
Horizontal Deconcentration)
The existence of the filed-rate doctrine has not affected the regu-
lation of mergers in the electric power industry under the antitrust
laws.26 The DOJ and the FTC (hereafter referred to as the "anti-
trust agencies") have the authority under Section 7 of the Clayton
Act to prevent mergers or acquisitions that "may ... substantially
lessen competition."2 65 Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, mergers
and acquisitions that exceed a transaction-value threshold require a
pre-merger notification with the antitrust agencies and cannot be
consummated until the waiting period has elapsed.266 FERC has
merger-review authority under the FPA and evaluates mergers
under the broader "public interest" standard; state public utility
commissions have similar authority under state statutes.26 7 An an-
ticompetitive merger can confer increased unilateral market power
on the merged entity and facilitate collusion, due to the reduction
in the number of independent competitors. 2 Merger enforcement
is a prospective exercise. 269 FERC and the antitrust agencies must
predict, based on economic theory and empirical evidence from
similar contexts, whether a merger is likely to reduce competition.
263. See Blumsack et al., supra note 189, at 29 ("FERC and the states should not be naive
in thinking that small changes in a regulated market, or in the restructured markets, will lead
to the sort of vigorous competition that has characterized the deregulated airline, trucking,
and telecommunications industries. The successful restructured markets rely on close moni-
toring and ordering generators to engage in behavior such as providing reactive power or
providing electricity at cost."); see id. ("The data show that prices for industrial customers,
who were expected to be the principal beneficiaries [of restructuring], have no statistically
significant differences between restructured and un-restructured states.").
264. Town of Norwood v. New England Power Co., 202 F.3d at 422 (citations omitted) ("For
reasons that reflect more history than logic, the limitations on antitrust litigation derived
from federal administrative regulation reflect a schizophrenic split. Direct antitrust attacks
on federally regulated rates have.., been limited by the filed-rate doctrine. So have attacks
on other regulated matters underlying rates (like power allocation among electricity custom-
ers). But the Supreme Court says there is otherwise no across-the-board antitrust immunity
for agency-approved transactions.").
265. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
266. Id. § 18a.
267. 16 U.S.C. § 824b (2006); see also Diana L. Moss, Antitrust Versus Regulatmy Merger Re-
view: The Case of Electricit, 32 REv. IDus. ORG. 241, 245 (2008).
268. U.S. DEP'T OF JusMc & U.S. FEE.RAL TRADE COMM'N, HosuzoNTAL MERGER GUIDE-
uqas 2 (2010).
269. Albert A. Foer, Prediction and Antitruws 56 ANTrmusT BuLL. 505, 508 (2011).
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To offer guidance to business, the antitrust agencies have issued
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Guidelines), which FERC has
adopted.2 70 The most recent Guidelines were issued in 2010 and
reflect the actual merger practice of the antitrust agencies over the
past twenty years. 271 They explain the five-step process the antitrust
agencies use to analyze mergers: (1) defining geographic and prod-
uct market definition, (2) computing market concentration, (3)
examining competitive effects, (4) weighing procompetitive effi-
ciencies, and (5) considering the likelihood, sufficiency, and
timeliness of new entry.272 Mergers that increase market concentra-
tion above a certain level and by a certain amount face a rebuttable
presumption of being anticompetitive. 273 To overcome this pre-
sumption, the merging parties can present evidence that the
transaction will not reduce competition, that it will create offsetting
economic efficiencies, or that the threat of rapid entry from new
firms will constrain the exercise of market power.27 4 The latest ver-
sion of the Guidelines does not bind the antitrust agencies to follow
the five-step analytical process and states that direct effects evi-
dence-for example, econometric evidence predicting a price
increase from a merger-will play a major role in merger analysis
when available. 275 FERC has declined to adopt the 2010 Guidelines.
Instead, it will continue to follow the analytical approaches laid out
in the 1992 Guidelines, on the grounds that the lower market-con-
centration thresholds for mergers in the 1992 Guidelines are more
appropriate for electricity markets. 2
76
The current use of concentration measures raises the possibility
that the antitrust agencies and FERC approve mergers that are, in
270. Inquiry Concerning the Commission's Merger Policy Under the Federal Power Act:
Policy Statement, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,595 (1996), recons. denied, 62 Fed. Reg. 33,341 (1997).
271. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, supra note 268.
272. See id. at 7-25, 27-32 (2010) (describing in detail the antitrust agencies'
methodology).
273. Id. at 19.
274. Id. at 27-32.
275. See id. at 3 ("The Agencies look for historical events, or 'natural experiments,' that
are informative regarding the competitive effects of the merger. For example, the Agencies
may examine the impact of recent mergers, entry, expansion, or exit in the relevant market.
Effects of analogous events in similar markets may also be informative."); id. at 21 ("Where
sufficient data are available, the Agencies may construct economic models designed to quan-
tify the unilateral price effects resulting from the merger. These models often include
independent price responses by non-merging firms. They also can incorporate merger-spe-
cific efficiencies. These merger simulation methods need not rely on market definition. The
Agencies do not treat merger simulation evidence as conclusive in itself, and they place more
weight on whether their merger simulations consistently predict substantial price increases
than on the precise prediction of any single simulation.").
276. Order Reaffirming Commission Policy and Terminating Procedure: Analysis of Hori-
zontal Market Power under the Federal Power Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,492, 10,492 (2012).
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fact, anticompetitive. Due to inelastic supply and demand, electric-
ity markets are extremely vulnerable to the exercise of unilateral
and joint market power.2 77 Generators with market shares that
would not raise antitrust concerns in many markets may have the
incentive and ability to exercise market power.2 78 Consequently, re-
lying on market share and derived concentration measures may not
accurately screen anticompetitive transactions in electricity-the
same issue FERC has faced in using market share and concentra-
tion measures in evaluating applications for market-based rate
authority.279 The current screens are administratively cost effective
but are likely far too tolerant of generator mergers that enhance
market power.2 8
0
Given the limitations of the Guidelines' concentration thresholds
in power markets, FERC and the antitrust agencies could rely more
on prospective market simulations of mergers. Sophisticated com-
puter models can simulate prices in a wholesale market when given
inputs such as the level of demand, technical characteristics of the
generation fleet, transmission line capacities, and fuel prices.
281
They can now also model collusive behavior and complex bidding
strategies.2 82 With the increasing sophistication of models, market
simulations can forecast a merger's competitive effects with greater
precision. 283 Since models can be rigged to reach the desired result,
careful calibration of models is important. To establish their analyti-
cal credibility in forecasting the price effects of a merger, models
are typically fine-tuned to "predict" past electricity prices accu-
rately.28 4  The complexity of market simulations, however,
277. See supra part IIl.ii.
278. Borenstein et al., supra note 185, at 68.
279. Bush, supra note 47, at 286.
280. See id. at 283 ("The value of a merger screen to FERC, if there is one, is that it allows
FERC to dispose of the merger in rapid fashion. However, the costs of such a screen involve
both the possibilities that the screen will trip up competitive mergers (the problem of false
positives) while unleashing some anticompetitive ones (the problem of false negatives)."); id.
at 286 ("[Mlarket share screens have the potential for 'false negatives.' While corrections for
any 'false positives' brought about by market share calculations exist in the Guidelines in the
form of entry and other analysis, there is no such corrective mechanism for 'false
negatives.' ").
281. Bastian et al., supra note 217, at 42-44.
282. See Anke Weidlich & Daniel Veit, A Critical Survey of Agent-Based Electricity Market Mod-
els, 30 ENERGY ECON. 1728, 1729-30 (2008).
283. See id. at 1732-33.
284. See GregoryJ. Werden et al., A Daubert Discipline for Merger Simulation, As.'ITRusr,
Summer 2004, at 89, 90-91.
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represents a serious shortcoming. Due to the level of detail in-
volved, performing market simulations is data- and time-intensive
and thus can be very costly.
285
With the inadequacies of traditional concentration screens and
the administrative difficulties associated with market simulation
models, FERC and the antitrust agencies could also consider sim-
pler but still robust screens for determining whether a merger
enhances market power. The competitive residual demand (CRD)
test developed by Richard Gilbert and David Newbery is such an
example.28 6 The model computes market prices and profits for the
merged entities based on their level of output under different de-
mand conditions.2 87 It takes into account the distinctive features of
electricity markets and can identify anticompetitive mergers that
may not be caught using traditional concentration screens.288 Along
with having greater predictive accuracy, the CRD test is also more
workable than equilibrium models, requiring only information on
the capacities and variable costs of generators.28 9 A notable short-
coming of the CRD approach, however, is that it cannot predict
whether a merger will enhance the likelihood of successful coordi-
nation-a limitation that Gilbert and Newbery acknowledge.2 90 To
be more complete, the CRD analysis needs to be supplemented
with an examination of a transaction's effects on the probability of
tacit coordination.
291
State legislatures and regulators should consider generation
divestitures as a tool in addressing wholesale markets that remain
noncompetitive even after other interventions. Antitrust law in the
United States itself is seen as powerless to reduce concentration un-
less it is the product of mergers.2 92 Even in the case of
anticompetitive mergers that have been consummated, the antitrust
agencies sometimes recognize that after-the-fact structural remedies
may not be feasible on administrative grounds.293 In electricity,
285. Richard Gilbert & David Newbery, Analytical Screens for Electricity Mergers, 32 REv. IN-
DUS. ORG. 217, 219 (2008).
286. Id. at 223.
287. Id.
288. See id. at 222-27 (describing a hypothetical merger that would have anticompetitive
effects and be deemed anticompetitive by CRD but not by concentration screens).
289. Id. at 229.
290. Id. at 227-29.
291. See Bush, supra note 47, at 282.
292. See supra Part VI.ii (discussing how no-fault monopoly and oligopoly laws were con-
sidered in the mid-twentieth century as a response to persistently high prices but were never
enacted into law).
293. See, e.g., In the Matter of Evanston Nw. Health Care Corp., 2008 FTC LEXIS 62, at
*1-2 (2008).
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divestitures can erode the economies of scale and of scope associ-
ated with large and diversified generation portfolios and create
other operational problems.2 94 Given these concerns, divestitures
should probably be used sparingly, especially if careful merger con-
trol can maintain competitive market conditions. Yet divestitures
should remain an option. For example, market simulations have in-
dicated that additional divestitures of generation capacity could
have partly mitigated the painful effects of the California electricity
crisis.29
5
In the United Kingdom, power-sector regulators ordered divesti-
tures of generation capacity in an attempt to improve market
performance. Market power was a serious problem in the first sev-
eral years of the British power market's operation in the early
1990s. The generation assets of the previously state-owned monop-
oly were sold to three firms, with two firms owning all the capacity
that set market prices.29 6 Market prices rose by 40 percent and re-
mained high during the first four years of the market's existence.
2 97
Observers generally believed that the concentrated market was the
culprit behind the high prices and disappointing results of industry
restructuring: the two dominant generators exercised market power
unilaterally and also colluded tacitly.298 The British electricity regu-
lator, in response, threatened to refer these generators to the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (the British antitrust author-
ity) .21 The two main generation owners agreed to sell some of their
capacity to third parties to avoid referral. °00 Following a series of
divestitures and an overhaul of market rules in 2001, prices in the
British power market moved closer to competitive levels. 10' Al-
though the research is not clear on whether the divestitures or the
actual or expected revision in market rules contributed to more
294. Wolak, supra note 73, at 24-25.
295. See Bushnell, supra 83, at 289.
296. Andrew Sweeting, Market Power in the England and Wales Wholesale Electridty Market
1995-2000, 117 ECON. J. 654, 657 (2007).
297. JOHN BOWER, WHY DIn ELEcmcr PRiCES FALL IN ENGLAND AND WALES? MARKET
MECHANISM OR MARKET STRUCTURE? 1-2 (Oxford Instit. for Energy Studies 2002).
298. See, e.g., Sweeting, supra note 296, at 681; Catherine D. Wolfram, Measuring Duopoly
Power in the British Electricity Spot Market 89 AM. ECON. REV. 805, 821 (1999).
299. Sweeting, supra note 296, at 658.
300. Id.
301. NATAuA FABRA & JUAN TORO, THE FALL IN BRITISH ELECTucrry PRICES: MARKET
Ruxzs, MARKET STRucTURE, OR BOTH? 1 (2003); Joanne Evans & Richard Green, Why Did
British Electricity Prices fall after 1998? 3 (Ctr. For Energy & Envtl. Policy Research, Working
Paper No. 03-007, 2003).
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competitive prices, some empirical evidence suggests that the dives-
titures deserve some credit for improved market outcomes.3
°2
B. Promoting Investment in Transmission
The transmission grid was mostly built in the old vertically inte-
grated, natural-monopoly environment and is not structured to
accommodate the long-distance trading that occurs in power mar-
kets today.303 The inadequacy of the grid manifests itself in the form
of transmission congestion. When this occurs, more expensive gen-
eration located closer to load centers needs to be dispatched in
place of more economical units located outside the congested
zone.304 The costs of transmission congestion are substantial-con-
sumers pay billions more annually due to inadequate transmission
capacity.305
On top of requiring the dispatch of more costly generation units,
inadequate capacity on the existing transmission grid has been an
important cause of market-power problems. When only a handful
of companies own all the generation in a transmission-constrained
market, they may have the ability and incentive to raise prices well
above competitive levels. KeySpan's anticompetitive behavior be-
tween 2006 and 2008 exploited New York City's frequent isolation
from the Upstate New York market due to transmission congestion.
KeySpan could conspire with its rival generator to raise capacity
prices, because (as is still the case) the generators within New York
City faced little or no competition from generators located upstate
and were owned by relatively few companies.306
302. Compare Bower, supra note 297, at 43 (presenting an empirical analysis of how reduc-
tions in market concentration through divestitures and new entry can lead to lower prices)
with Evans & Green, supra note 301, at 12 (finding that the announced replacement of single-
price pools with bilateral trading arrangements undermined incentives for generators to col-
lude tacitly).
303. Kirby & Hirst, supra note 57, at 65-66.
304. Id.
305. See, e.g., MONITORING ANALyTrcs, LC, 2010 QUARTERLY STATE OF THE MARKET RE-
PORT FOR PJM: JANUARY THROUGH MARCH 167 (2010) ("Total [economic] congestion costs
increased by $237.3 million or 58 percent from $408.2 million in the first six months of 2009
to $645.5 million in the first six months of 2010."); POTOMAC ECONOMICS, 2010 STATE OF THE
MARKET REPORT FOR THE MISO Er scTmcrry MARKETS 85 (2011) ("Real-time congestion in-
creased by 18 percent to $1.03 billion in 2010.").
306. See Daniel L. Shawhan et al., An Experimental Test of Automatic Mitigation of Wholesale
Electricity Prices, 29 IWT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 46, 47 (2011) ("[Cloncentrated ownership and fre-
quent transmission congestion give NYC's generation owners market power. . . . [S] ix
companies own 99% of the generation capacity in NYC."); U.S. DEP'T OF ENtEecy, NATIONAL
ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION CONGESTION STUDY 44-45 (2009).
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Investment in the transmission grid can yield several benefits, in-
cluding lower power prices due to greater competition. If greater
transmission capacity had existed between Upstate New York and
New York City, more generators could have served the metropolitan
area's market and prevented KeySpan from engaging in anticompe-
titive behavior. The benefits of transmission investment are not
restricted to lower prices. By creating larger and more competitive
power markets, transmission investment can enhance system relia-
bility and integrate remote renewable resources.
30 7
FERC has been trying to promote transmission investment over
the past decade. It has offered a variety of incentives to promote
such investment, ranging from higher returns on equity to more
favorable depreciation schedules. 308 In the summer of 2011, FERC
issued Order 1000 to improve the transmission-planning process.3°9
The Order requires all transmission owners to be a part of a re-
gional transmission bodym-a function performed by RTOs.310 It also
sets out high-level guidelines on how costs of new transmission
projects-which are still regulated as natural monopolies, for the
most part-should be allocated.31' Despite some important short-
comings3 12 Order 1000.should help reduce some of the barriers to
transmission development.
FERC's many initiatives in transmission deserve credit, but con-
gressional preemption of state authority in this area is necessary.
State jurisdiction over siting and cost-allocation decisions has
proven to be an important obstacle to building a grid that can sup-
port market transactions. 3 3 State regulators have resisted and, in
some instances, prevented the construction of new transmission
lines that yield regional benefits but produce concentrated local
307. See Sandeep Vaheesan, Preempting Parochialism and Protectionism in Power, 49 HARv. J.
ON LEGIS. 87, 100-10 (2012) (describing the social benefits of transmission investments).
308. See Promoting Transmission Investment through Pricing Reform, 71 Fed. Reg.
43,294 (2006); Steven W. Snarr, ERC Rate Incentives for Transmission Infrastructure Development,
EuculucrrvJ., Mar. 2010, at 6.
309. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating
Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842 (2011).
310. Id. at 49,845.
311. Id. at 49,846.
312. See Letter from Diana Moss, Vice President and Senior Fellow, American Antitrust
Institute, to Kimberly D. Bose, Secretary, FERC, regarding the American Antitrust Institute's
Comments on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding Transmission Planning and
Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities (September 29,
2010), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/-antirust/sites/default/files/AAI%20
commentsTx%20Plning%20and%2Cst%20Alloc._Sept% 2029%202010.pdf •(criticizing Or-
der 1000 for allowing incumbent utilities to veto transmission proposals and not factoring in
competition benefits of transmission grid expansions).
313. Vaheesan, supra note 307, at 115-22.
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costsA' 4 Although Congress granted FERC "backstop" authority to
site transmission lines in the event state and local actors could not
approve or failed to act on transmission proposals, this authority
has been ineffective in overcoming state and local resistance to
transmission-line development and was further neutered in a 2009
appellate ruling.
315
The Palo Verde-Devers II line that Southern California Edison
(SCE) proposed to build between Arizona and California illustrates
how regional transmission projects have run aground at the state
level. The line would have facilitated greater power exports from
Arizona to California. This increased power flow from east to west
would have lowered power prices in California through improved
dispatch and increased competition.Y6 An additional benefit would
have been reduced emissions of air pollutants, due to more effi-
cient generation in Arizona displacing output from less efficient
units in California.3 7 Arizona regulators, however, vetoed the pro-
posal, citing how residents of their state would bear the aesthetic
and environmental costs of a project that would principally benefit
Californians. 318 Unable to obtain the necessary approvals, SCE set-
tled on building a shorter intrastate transmission facility in
California. 319
C. Developing Demand-Side Responses
The invisibility of real-time prices to most ratepayers is an impor-
tant reason why market power has been a serious and persistent
problem in restructured electricity markets. In most markets, high
prices translate into lower demand and act as a constraint on sup-
pliers who try to raise prices, unilaterally or collectively. For
suppliers, setting high prices can result in a higher margin on ex-
isting sales but can also lead to a loss of sales volume. The reduced
314, Id. at 115-17.
315. Id. at 123-24 (discussing Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304 (4th Cir.
2009)).
316. Mohamed Labib Awad et al., Using Market Simulations for Economic Assessment of Trans-
mission Upgrades: Application of the California ISO Approach, in RESTRTURED ELECTruc POWER
SYSTEMS: ANALYSIS OF ELEcriucrrv MARKETS wiTH EQuILIBIUM MODELS 241, 260 (Xiao-Ping
Zhang ed., 2010).
317. Id. at 265.
318. Paul Davenport, Arizona Regulators Reject New Electric Line to California, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., May 30, 2007, available at http://egacy.signonsandiego.com/news/state/
20070530-1728-wst-sharingpower.html.
319. Cassandra Sweet, Edison International Unit Wins Approvalfor Calif Transmission Line,
Dow JONES Bus. NEWS, Nov. 20, 2009, available at http://www.advfn.com/nyse/StockNews.
asp?stocknews=EIX&article=40459570 (last visited Oct. 26, 2012).
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quantity of sales may more than offset the effect of increased prices,
making price increases unprofitable. In electricity markets, how-
ever, most consumers pay a fixed retail rate at all hours of the day
that is adjusted only infrequently by the state public utility commis-
sion 20 Their insulation from the underlying price of electricity
gives them little reason to reduce their consumption when supply-
demand conditions are tight and wholesale prices are high. Since
demand is highly inelastic, generators can increase prices without
losing salesA21 Combined with the inelasticity of supply as load ap-
proaches peak levels, demand-side inelasticity makes the exercise of
market power highly profitable during hours of peak demand.
If customers pay a price that is tied to wholesale prices, they will
likely change their electric consumption patterns. At present, the
use of fixed prices based on the average of hourly prices leads to a
price that is too high in off-peak hours, when the wholesale price is
comparatively low, and too low in peak hours, when the wholesale
price is typically higher.322 Correcting this distortion can be ex-
pected to lead to increased consumption of power in the early
morning and late night and decreased consumption in the late af-
ternoon and early evening. 32 3 For example, individuals would be
more likely to run energy-intensive home appliances like dishwash-
ers and washing machines at hours when power prices are lower.
Although retail prices that perfectly track wholesale prices would be
the ideal policy for many economists, this type of "dynamic" pricing
would be fraught with problems. Many residential customers, for
example, may not be able to adjust their power usage in response to
frequent price changes and may be saddled with significantly
higher monthly utility bills.3 24 Dynamic pricing, in which customers
pay the hourly wholesale price, could lead to significant wealth
transfers from ratepayers to utilities and inflict substantial eco-
nomic harm on low-income households.32 5
Demand-side bidding is one way of dealing with the problem of
inelastic demand. Under this system, large customers, typically in-
dustrial firms, bid into the wholesale market a demand increment
that they are willing to curtail, and are treated like another source
320. Borenstein, supra note 40, at 196.
321. Id.
322. Ahmad Faruqui & Sanem Sergici, Household Response to Dynamic Pricing of Electricity: A
Survey of 15 Experiments, 38 J. REG. ECON. 2, 193, 194 (2010).
323. See id.
324. Marc Levinson, Is the Smart Grid Really a Smart Idea?, IssuEs IN SCE & TECH., Fail 2010,
available at http://www.issues.org/27.1/levinson.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2012).
325. See id.
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of supply.326 If the wholesale price matches or exceeds their bid in a
given hour, these customers must curtail their demand by the bid
amount or pay the wholesale price of power at the time.32 7 Allowing
large consumers to bid their demand can thus provide incentives to
reduce power consumption during periods of high prices.
In recent years, state regulators and utilities have also tried to
expose a greater number of residential customers to wholesale
prices (or some proxy of them). These programs create at least
some modest variation in retail rates that reflect the changing costs
of producing power within a given day. Technological changes like
advanced metering and remote control of appliances have permit-
ted experimentation in this area.328 Utilities have run pilot
programs in which a small subset of residential ratepayers pay dif-
ferent peak and off-peak prices (time-of-use pricing) or very high
rates during hours with very high demand (critical peak pricing)
and receive enabling technologies like advanced thermostats that
take electricity prices into account when setting indoor air
temperatures. 3
29
Replacing fixed retail rates with variable prices for even a minor-
ity of customers can discipline generators from exercising market
power. If demand fell in response to higher prices, exercising mar-
ket power would not be as profitable as it is currently. Generators
would recognize that exercising market power would sometimes be
unprofitable as higher prices trigger a fall in the quantity of power
used.A30 In fact, experimental studies have suggested that demand-
side responses could completely defeat the exercise of market
power.331 Even if these findings do not translate perfectly into real-
world markets, demand-side responses would, at the very least,
create electricity markets that resemble other markets in which
price signals play an important function in disciplining oligopolistic
producers. 332 Empirical research supports the theoretical argument
that real-time pricing would lead to changes in electricity usage,
326. M.H. Albadi & E.F. EI-Saadany, A Summary of Demand Response in Electricity Markets, 78
ELEcT-c POWER SYSTEMS RES. 1989, 1990 (2000).
327. See P. Jazayeri et al., A Survey of Load Control for Price and System Stability, 20 IEEE
TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS 1504, 1507 (2005) (describing New York's demand bidding
program).
328. Faruqui & Sergici, supra note 322, at 193.
329. Id.
330. Jon Wellinghoff & David L. Morenoff, Recognizing the Importance of Demand Response:
The Second Half of the Wholesale Electric Market Equation, 28 ENERGY L.J. 389, 401-02 (2007).
331. Stephen J. Rassenti et al., Controlling Market Power and Price Spikes in Electricity Net-
works: Demand-Side Bidding, 100 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 2998, 3003 (2003).
332. See Bushnell, supra note 79, at 289 ("Even a relatively modest elasticity of .075, when
applied to the entire system demand through a dynamic pricing regime, reduces wholesale
prices by 40 percent.").
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even among residential consumers. Demand reductions in peak
hours have ranged from 3 percent for time-of-use pricing schemes
to 44 percent for critical-peak pricing programs combined with ena-
bling technologies. 333 For profit-maximizing generators, the threat
of the quantity of power demanded falling in response to higher
prices would alter the economic calculus of unilaterally or jointly
exercising market power.
CONCLUSION
In the electric power industry, the courts have failed to follow
Alfred Kahn's recommendations on how to replace price regulation
with market pricing. The federal judiciary has not permitted full
enforcement of the antitrust laws even as markets have supplanted
state regulators in setting wholesale electricity prices. Despite the
persistent problem of market-power abuse in electricity markets,
the courts have continued to apply the filed-rate doctrine-created
by the Supreme Court in an era in which regulators fixed final
prices on many essential services-to bar private antitrust damages
actions against power suppliers accused of anticompetitive conduct.
Several circuits have held that even in a market environment,
courts should refrain from applying the antitrust laws to their ful-
lest degree. These courts have overstated the institutional
capabilities of industry regulators and understated the competence
of the judiciary. Congress or the Supreme Court should limit the
application of this doctrine, which has created an oligopolistic mar-
ket without the usual oversight from private antitrust enforcers. As
the KeySpan episode in New York illustrates, private antitrust en-
forcement can help deter more explicit forms of collusive conduct
between market participants.
Yet, eliminating the filed-rate doctrine would not cure the persis-
tent market-power problems seen in electricity markets. The
antitrust laws, as they are interpreted today, do not proscribe unilat-
eral withholding and impose high evidentiary burdens on
establishing tacit collusion-two significant forms of anticompeti-
tive behavior witnessed in electricity markets. The California
electricity crisis in 2000 and 2001 and TXU's elevation of wholesale
prices in Texas in the summer of 2005 likely could not have been
remedied through private antitrust damages actions. Although they
inflicted significant harm on the public-leading in California to
perhaps as much as $20 billion in wealth transfers from ratepayers
333. Faruqui & Sergici, supra note 322, at 221.
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to generators-these episodes were likely the result of unilateral
profit-maximizing behavior that does not run afoul of the antitrust
laws.
With the limits of private antitrust enforcement in wholesale
power markets, state and federal regulators must play the lead role
in creating competitive market structures. They should apply
greater scrutiny to generation mergers and extant market power,
promote the construction of new transmission lines, and encourage
the deployment of real-time pricing for ratepayers. The first two
policies would address two supply-side factors-high market con-
centration and small geographic markets-that have made power
markets susceptible to the exercise of unilateral and collective mar-
ket power by generators. The third policy would help remedy the
inelastic demand that makes the exercise of market power so profit-
able for generators. Although many skeptics view the creation of
electricity markets as a failed experiment, regulators could still cre-
ate markets conducive to competition and redeem the once-great
promise of industry restructuring.
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